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 This thesis analyzes the recent Version 10.7 Operational Flight Program (v10.7 
OFP) Flight Control System upgrade to the F/A-18A-D (legacy) Hornet fighter aircraft.  
This developmental program endeavored to improve high angle-of-attack (AOA) 
maneuverability while vastly reducing the aircraft’s susceptibility to sustained out-of-
controlled flight events.   
 
 Although the original F/A-18 Hornet, designated F/A-18A through F/A-18D, has 
been acclaimed for its departure resistance as well as its exceptional maneuverability as a 
fighter aircraft, the model, in actuality, has suffered from significant losses due to out-of-
controlled flight (OCF) mishaps.  Since its development in the early 1980s, eighteen 
Hornets have been lost to a particular OCF mode called “Falling Leaf”, including eight 
aircraft crashed since 1999.    With no improvements, 10 additional aircraft, at a cost of 
$40 million each, were forecast to be lost. 
 
 Two-seat aircraft are lost at a higher rate per flight hour than the more common 
single-seat version.  Analysis of flight test data indicates that more two-seat aircraft 
sustain Falling Leaf mode due to their increased departure susceptibility.  Additionally, it 
is apparent that the increased sprung mass of the control system, due to the addition of 
the rear cockpit control stick, may delay or inhibit recovery from a sustained Falling Leaf 
departure.  This may be caused by uncommanded Flight Control System inputs from 
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lateral control stick inertial motion induced by high sideforces encountered during a 
Falling Leaf. 
 
 The v10.7 OFP test effort conducted a complete out-of-control flight test program 
without the benefit of having an attached spin-recovery parachute during testing. The 
specific test method and risk mitigation techniques used during this test program are 
reviewed and documented in this thesis to provide a historical record for future testing.  
By using the lessons learned from the development of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet 
testing conducted a few years earlier, the v10.7 Team was able to complete the test at a 
large cost and schedule savings. 
 
 The author concludes that the test program is an exceptional success.  The new 
low airspeed and high AOA maneuvering capabilities inherent with the v10.7 software 
revolutionize how pilot aircrew will fight the aircraft.  Further, the extremely enhanced 
resistance to sustained departure modes during out-of-controlled flight events will 






“I CAN’T BELIEVE THIS IS HAPPENING….” 
 
 It’s 1998 and I’ve got less than 12 hours logged as hornet pilot.  I’m airborne on 
my first local “day trainer” flight in a two-seat F/A-18D.  At that time, I had amassed 
over 2000 total military flying hours, over 1000 of them mastering the quirky flying 
qualities of the departure prone F-14 Tomcat with its antiquated analog flight control 
computers (FCS).  My previous total of four Hornet flights had all been administrative 
cross countries.   
It’s my second flight after reporting to my new test squadron after Test Pilot 
School (TPS) and I’d like to “bend the jet around” a little and take a look at the aircraft’s 
famed superior flying qualities and extreme high angle-of-attack (AOA) capability.  
Although scheduled as a test-support flight to chase a Super Hornet during its test flight, 
the other jet was not ready on time, so I went out as a single aircraft, with my new Hornet 
Department boss in my back seat, on a good deal flight to help build my experience in the 
jet. 
 My backseater this day was not a pilot but instead a Marine Corps Weapons 
Systems Officer (WSO).  He encouraged me to start right off with some rather extreme 
maneuvering right after climbing to altitude in the assigned Test Range.  However, I was 
fresh out of TPS, so I elected to build up more gradually with some loops and rolls, then 
some level (1g) high AOA maneuvers.  Boy, everyone’s right—this jet’s a dream to fly 
compared to the Tomcat.  It seems like its on rails, almost magical in its capabilities. 
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With half of my fuel used, my backseater convinces me to “turn up the heat a 
little” and try something new.  It was time to try an aggressive high AOA wingover-type 
maneuver called a pirouette maneuver—starting at 18,000 feet, 300 knots, I aggressively 
pull up, then start rolling left…down to 170 knots now at 22,500 feet, feeding in more 
left rudder pedal and left and aft stick…nose is still a hair above the horizon but should 
come down.  I’m rolled left wing knife-edge down, but the nose has stopped as the jet 
decelerates through 120 knots.  Hmmm? Oops, AOA is way up at 40 degrees, better add 
a hair of forward stick to reduce the AOA. Although I’ve got left stick and rudder inputs 
commanded, the jet stops responding and in fact starts a slight right roll.  Darn, I’ve 
departed—I recite the NATOPS Procedures: CONTROLS—RELEASE, FEET OFF 
RUDDERS, Speed brake in, Throttles IDLE…  My backseater is laughing at me.   
I’m at 22, 800 feet, out-of-control on a beautiful CAVU summer day over the 
Chesapeake Bay.  I’m waiting for the nose to come down, lawn-dart fashion, just like all 
the other jets I’ve flown. Still waiting.  Finally, the nose is 40 degrees below the horizon, 
but there’s considerable side force (lateral g) building, pushing me forcefully to the right 
side of the cockpit.  Time stands still.  I hear the wind roaring sideways over the top of 
the cockpit canopy and windscreen. The yaw rate warning tone is screaming at me.  
Then, the nose comes back up, way up (it’s going the wrong way!).  I notice the control 
stick deflecting laterally.  At first I think somehow I must have inadvertently bumped it 
as I was flung sideways, but then realize that it’s actually moving in response to the same 
lateral g-forces pushing me around.  I try to re-center the stick by hand but its weight 
under g, as well as the awkward sideways g-forces, prevents me from holding it 
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stationary or being sure where the neutral position really is. As I briefly attempt to hold it 
neutral, I instantly understand why NATOPS says to just let go and not touch the controls 
so I let go again—one can’t hold the lightly sprung controls stationary while subjected to 
these violent forces.  More violent sideforces the other way, warning audio tones 
signaling that yaw rate is building, and disturbingly loud wind-like buffeting noise over 
the canopy and windshield.  I’m grabbing the towelbar-like handles on the metal canopy 
bow for leverage to avoid having my head smash into the Plexiglas canopy.  The laughter 
that I heard from my boss earlier in the backseat has stopped.  We’re falling through 
17,000 feet.  I think of reaching for the stick to shove it full forward per the falling leaf 
recovery procedure, but the NATOPS Manual warned of trying that procedure too early, 
and I don’t think that the steady periodic characteristic of the falling leaf mode is quite 
established.  Additionally, I’ve already seen a moment earlier holding the stick still 
would be tough to do.  I wish my lapbelt was tighter. 
Finally after a couple more oscillations, the nose comes down and stays down, the 
sideforces subside, and I’ve happily got a face-full of mother-earth to look at.  I pull out 
from the dive, bottoming out at 8,000 feet over the Bay.  I had lost about 14,000 feet 
during this OCF incident.  I’ve had enough fun for the day and immediately return to 
base and land.  I look over the jet carefully after I get out and verify it’s none the worse 
for wear, as I contemplate the “Jeckle and Hyde” Hornet—effortless to fly 99.9% of the 
time, but able to truly “uncork” if grossly mishandled. 
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My new boss, an experienced WSO with over 2000 hours in the Hornet later tells 
me that although I had a good departure, he had seen and been through a worse one 
before. 
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The departure characteristics of the F/A-18A-D Hornet received the personal 
attention of the author early on.  Within the first month of flying the aircraft, the author 
experienced a rather disconcerting out-of-controlled flight (OCF) event.  That event is 
described in detail in the Preface to this paper.    
The purpose of this thesis is to:  (a) detail the history of the legacy Hornet and the 
Falling Leaf character it exhibits, (b) discuss the methodology that was used to both 
suppress the Falling Leaf OCF characteristic and improve the high angle of attack (AOA) 
maneuvering capability of the aircraft, using technology that matured with the F/A-18E/F 
Super Hornet development program, (c) provide an historical record of the test 
methodology and risk mitigation techniques utilized by the test team to plan and conduct 
a high risk OCF flight test while achieving a moderately low cost goal, (d) discuss the 
results of the test program, and finally (e) draw conclusions based on those results. 
LIMITATIONS TO SCOPE OF THIS THESIS 
The scope of this thesis is limited to only the characteristics of the flight control 
software modifications that occurred during actual flight test.  Only results that directly 
affect departure resistance, high AOA maneuverability, and Falling Leaf suppression are 
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presented. The management of this developmental program, outside the realm of actual 
flight test, is not discussed.  Simulation and software development techniques are also 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
Furthermore, this thesis does not discuss the other aircraft issues that the new 
software was designed to improve.  Those issues included F/A-18 flight control system 
redundancy management, Automatic Carrier Landing System (ACLS) improvement, and 
Datalink degraded modes.       
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DESCRIPTION OF F/A-18A-D 
The F/A-18 Hornet first flew on November 18, 1978.  A three-view of the single 
seat variant is depicted below as figure 1.  The two-seat versions (F/A-18B and F/A-18D) 









The F/A-18 airplane is a high performance, twin engine, supersonic fighter and 
attack airplane manufactured by McDonnell Douglas Corporation (now Boeing, St. 
Louis).  The F/A-18A and F/A-18C are single seat aircraft while the B/D are tandem two-
seat versions.  The aircraft features mid-mounted, variable-camber wings with moderate 
sweep, twin vertical stabilizers canted out 20° from the vertical, and leading edge 
extensions (LEXs) along each side of the forward fuselage from the wing roots to just 
forward of the windshield.  Basic aircraft weight is approximately 25,000 lb and 
maximum takeoff weight is 51,900 lb.  Maximum internal fuel load is approximately 
10,200 pounds with the option of adding up to an additional 6,600 pounds of fuel in three 
(2,200 lb/tank) externally mounted fuel tanks. The remainder of the gross weight capacity 
allows for carriage of external stores and pod mounted sensors.  The airplane is 
configured with full span leading edge flaps, inboard trailing edge flaps, and outboard 
ailerons on each wing.  The flight control system consists of two digital flight control 
computers with 701E processors that utilize a full authority control augmentation system 
to operate the hydraulically driven control surfaces. The aircraft is equipped with twin 
General Electric F404-GE-400 low-bypass turbofan engines with afterburners, which are 
designed to produce 10,700 lb thrust at MIL and 16,000 lb thrust at MAX at sea level 
conditions.  Newer aircraft are equipped with F404-GE-402 Enhanced Performance 
Engines (EPE) with slightly higher thrust ratings.  Flight controls are hydraulically 
actuated and computer-driven according to pilot control inputs and flight conditions.  
Pilot interface for the flight control system is through a conventional center mounted 
control stick, rudder pedals, and dual engine throttles on the left console.  Spring 
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cartridges in all modes are designed to provide the pilot control stick and rudder feel.  
The aircraft is designed to carry a variety of air-to-air (A/A) and air-to-ground (A/G) 
weapons, as well as up to three 330 gallon external fuel tanks (EFTs).  The Hornet is 
equipped with systems designed to enable successful engagement of surface and airborne 
targets, and rapid switching between A/A and A/G modes.  Avionics (software) system 
interface is through an up-front-control (UFC), three multi-function display (MFD) units 
in each cockpit, and a head-up display (HUD) for the forward cockpit.  Additionally, 
extensive system control is accessible to the aircrew with controls located on the throttle 
and control stick through the hands-on-throttle-and-stick (HOTAS) system.  
HORNET FLYING QUALITIES 
Although very early on in the developmental program, the Hornet’s overall flying 
qualities could be described as rather poor, that deficiency was rapidly remedied with 
minor structural changes and modification to its flight control system (FCS) software 
(Sweetman, 1987).  Since that time, each successive version of the FCS software load, 
referred to as an Operational Flight Program (OFP), has either further enhanced the 
actual flying qualities of the aircraft or provided the pilot with better FCS displays or 
failure detection modes.   The several revisions of the FCS software are listed in figure 2. 
OFP Version 10.5.1, first introduced in 1996, has provided exceptional flying 
qualities and superior maneuverability for both U. S. Navy pilots as well as several 










Figure 2.  F/A-18A-D Flight Control Computer (FCC) Operational Flight Program (OFP) 
Developmental History from 1980 through 2004 (DeMond, 2003). 
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extensions forward of the wing and fully fly-by-wire advanced digital flight controls, 
truly enhanced its extreme low speed handling capabilities.  To fight other aircraft, 
Hornet pilots were taught to exploit the Hornet’s superior high angle of attack (AOA) 
maneuverability to ensure their best chance for victory in an air-to-air dogfight.  
Maneuvering the Hornet safely at slow speed however required special precautions and 
was not without risk. That is because the Hornet exhibits an unfortunate “cliff” in its 
handling characteristics.  The exceptional flying qualities the F/A-18 exhibits from the 
well integrated Control Augmentation System (CAS) tends to lull the unwary pilot into 
attempting ill-advised maneuvers impossible to complete. The easily identified pilot 
feedback that typically accompanies flight near the aerodynamic limit in most aircraft 
(such as wind noise, buffet, or degraded flying qualities) is much more subtle in a Hornet. 
  Therefore, the one glaring exception to the Hornet’s brilliant reputation has been a 
continued susceptibility to an out-of-controlled (OCF) flight regime known as the 
“Falling Leaf” mode.  
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CHAPTER III.  HISTORY OF THE FALLING LEAF MODE AND 
PROPOSED REMEDIES 
EARLY TESTING 
The first F/A-18 lost at sea was due to an Out-of-Controlled flight incident during 
Basic Fighter Maneuvering (BFM) testing.  This incident occurred on 14 November 1980 
at Patuxent River Naval Air Station, during the developmental testing of the Hornet.  
Since that time, 19 additional aircraft, and several pilot lives have been lost due to 
crashes caused by OCF.   
There are two primary sustained departure modes of the Hornet—a spin mode and 
a Falling Leaf mode.  The aircraft FCS is equipped with a Spin Recovery Mode (SRM) 
that includes flashing command arrows on the cockpit displays and simple pilot 
procedure to input lateral stick in the direction of the command arrow.   However, the 
Hornet has rarely been found to spin operationally and the SRM has not assisted in many 
recoveries.  Unfortunately, the Spin Recovery Mode has a tendency to falsely activate in 
a Falling Leaf departure.   Of the twenty aircraft lost due to OCF, eighteen of the mishaps 
were attributed to the Falling Leaf sustained departure mode (Heller, 2003).  In addition 
to this, numerous formal Hazard Report Messages detailing Falling Leaf departure near-




DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE FALLING LEAF MODE 
The Falling Leaf motion can best be characterized as in-phase roll and yaw 
oscillation with basic characteristics similar to the well known Dutch roll mode.  The 
Falling Leafmode has a 4-6 second period and is sustained with little or no damping.  The 
motion is bounded by steeply banked rolls, large AOA and sideslip excursions, and with 
large sideforce peaks. AOA typically varies from –10 to 70°; Angle of Bank (AOB) can 
achieve +/-100°; and peak yaw rates may exceed 60°/sec with heading changes of up to 
45°.  This periodic motion generates 1-1 ½ g’s of sideforce in the cockpit along with 
periods of near zero normal g causing a “light in the seat” sensation. This motion 
typically is sustained for significant time, resulting generally in altitude losses of 12,000 
feet, but occasionally as much as 24,000 feet (Heller, 2003).  An additional issue is that 
the falling leaf yaw rates generated were sufficiently strong to activate cycling spin 
recovery command arrows on the cockpit displays.  This problem was addressed in 1984 
by FCC OFP v10.1, designed to reduce the occurrence of false command arrows during 
Falling Leaf departures but the hazardous false spin arrow indications were not 
eliminated.  According to several hazard reports and mishap reports, pilots have 
improperly “chased” the false spin arrows with lateral stick inputs and inadvertently 
aggravated, delayed, or prevented recovery (Potter, 2001). 
Figure 3 depicts a time history of a typical Falling Leaf type departure captured 
during flight test on 7 April 2000.  Pitch rates are lower in magnitude (up to 30°/sec) than 
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Figure 3. F/A-18B Falling Leaf Motion (Typical) (7 April 2000 flight). 
 
about 90° phase difference.  The horizontal axis is time in secs from an arbitrary initial 
value. 
TWO SEAT VERSUS SINGLE SEAT FALLING LEAF SUSCEPTIBILITY 
Of the 20 OCF mishaps in the history of the Hornet, 7 have been in two-seat F/A-
18Ds.  The remainder have been in single-seat F/A-18A or C aircraft.  Although Potter 
concluded that there “appeared to be no difference between the various models in causing 
OOCF mishaps and this data suggested that OOCF accidents could occur in any F/A-18 
model” (Potter, 2001), this is not necessarily the case if one looks at a OCF departure rate 
per 100,000 flight hours.  Data obtained from the Naval Safety Center indicates that in 
Fiscal Year 2003, single-seat Hornets had 7 reported OCF events during 192,632 flight 
hours for a rate of 3.63.  In the same time period, two-seat Hornets had 4 events in just 
62,561 hours for a rate of 6.39 (Bates, 2004).  Two aircraft were lost in crashes during 
Fiscal Year 2003, one single-seat C and one two-seat D.  Therefore based on this data, 
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two-seat aircraft have almost twice the likelihood of encountering an OCF departure and 
over 3 times the likelihood of crashing due to the occurrence than single-seat Hornets. 
POSSIBLE PROBLEMS WITH THE TWO-CONTROL STICK MODIFICATION 
As was observed by the author and noted in the Preface, the control stick tends to 
displace laterally due to the strong oscillatory sideforces present during post stall 
gyrations and the Falling Leaf departure.  A time history of the hands free control stick 
position during the same Falling Leaf test event presented in figure 3 above, is provided 
in figure 4. Other recorded test data from two control stick configured aircraft revealed 
lateral stick motion of at least this magnitude and often times more than ¾ inch 
deflection, dependent apparently on the  mechanicalical characteristics of each individual 
























Figure 4.  F/A-18B/D Uncommanded Control Stick Motion Data During Falling Leaf 




During a recent informal test by the author, a single seat F/A-18C control stick 
was found to be well damped, with one slight overshoot when released from an initial 2 
inch lateral displacement.  The stick exhibited similar damping characteristic in either left 
or right directions.  However, a two-seat jet configured with two control sticks was found 
to exhibit three overshoots from similar initial displacements, with a damping ratio of 
about 0.4.  This difference in mechanical characteristics of the flight control sticks in the 
two-seat aircraft becomes quite perceptible if the pilot observes carefully.  This 
characteristic is due to the increased sprung mass of the 2-stick trainer-configured aircraft 
(Mitchell, 2003).   
In flight test of two-stick equipped F/A-18B/D, uncommanded lateral stick 
displacements of up to 0.79 inches were observed during falling leaf motion (Flight Test 
Data, 5 April 2000).  This is critical for two separate reasons.  The first is that this control 
stick movement is providing undesirable and uncommanded inputs to the FCCs.  The 
second issue is that in OFP 10.5.1, the Automatic Spin Recovery Mode (ASRM) is 
activated when the pilot—or inertial forces—slightly displaces the control stick laterally 
in the direction of the commanded spin recovery arrow greater than 0.3 inches.  As 
uncommanded inertial stick movement may exceed 0.3 inch, the FCC improperly enters 
the spin recovery mode.  As the aircraft is not in actuality in a spin regime, this 





HUMAN FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH OCF 
An out of control event has several very significant human factors issues lining up 
against the pilot.  Most obviously, out-of-control flight is an unplanned event, at least in 
all operational OCF cases. 
A summary of the adverse human factors issues present during typical unplanned 
OCF incidents are:   
1. Substantial aircrew stress when faced with an unfamiliar situation that 
historically has not been adequately simulated during training. 
2. Aircrew must quickly recover from the surprise, even shock, that they 
have seriously errored by departing the aircraft. 
3. The pilot anxiety level is typically rather high, fearful that ejection may be 
necessary and loss of the aircraft may be eminent.   
4. Disorientation from analytical or cognitive saturation or overload may 
occur due to the rapidity of changing flight parameters and display hysteresis, or sensor 
latency  (Wiener, 1988).      
5. Physical incapacitation due to dynamic load factors, including large side-
forces, during a Falling Leaf departure.  It is difficult or impossible to maintain precise 
control inputs in this dynamic environment.  Unintentional stick or rudder pedal inputs 
due to the violent aircraft motion environment are not uncommon unless the pilot is 
secured tightly in the seat by his harness and the pilot grabs the handholds on the canopy 
bow for leverage. 
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These issues combine to result in diminished situational awareness (SA), as well 
as the physiological phenomena of time dilation, reduced mental capacity, fixation, and 
vestibulo-ocular disorientation (Zamka, et al, 1997).  The problem is further exacerbated 
because Falling Leaf recovery takes time—and altitude.  This is due to the aircraft’s 
insufficient nose-down pitch control power available for recovery compared to the strong 
nose-up tendency caused by inertial pitch coupling (Potter, 1997).  The NATOPS Flight 
Manual actually specifies that “extraordinary patience” is required for recovery 
(NATOPS, 2003).  However, the mental trait of “extraordinary patience” is exceedingly 
difficult to achieve during any prolonged departure. 
 
HISTORY OF FALLING LEAF RECOVERY PROCEDURES 
For nearly twenty years of operation, the prescribed upright Falling Leaf recovery 
procedure in the Hornet was to place the control stick full forward while maintaining 
neutral lateral stick input and no rudder input (NATOPS, Change I, 1997).  The problem 
with this procedure was two fold: it was difficult to accomplish physically and (based on 
mishaps and near-mishaps) did not work very well.  Interestingly, this “Forward Stick” 
procedure was based only on simulation and was never flight tested during development 
(Potter, 2001).  Finally in 1999, this procedure was flight tested when contradictory 
evidence suggested that full aft stick (instead of full forward stick) would provide for a 
more effective recovery from a sustained positive AOA Falling Leaf departure.   
The results and conclusion from this five-flight test program were twofold: 
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1)  “Within the scope of the test, releasing the controls provided ‘very 
dependable’ departure recoveries.” 
2)  “Full forward Stick Inputs aggravated the initial departure and the rapid nose 
down pitch to negative AOA caused subsequent re-departures.  Additionally, this control 
input produced motion that was disorienting to the pilots due to the negative g 
conditions.” (Naval Message of Final Report, June 2000) 
Based on the results of this test, NATOPS was revised to delete pilot flight 
control inputs during OCF.  Therefore, unless a sustained spin was confirmed, recovery 
procedures for the pilot were to maintain controls released and (patiently) await recovery. 
 In addition to the new procedure, a special “Departure Demonstration” flight syllabus 
was developed and implemented by NAWCAD to educate Fleet aviators on the Hornet 
departure characteristics.  In his 2001 Thesis, “Analysis of Programs and Procedures 
Designed to Mitigate F/A-18 Mishaps Caused by Out of Control Flight”, Potter 
concludes, “These programs and procedures are likely to substantially reduce the number 
of aircraft lost to OOCF (out of control flight)” (Potter, 2001).    
Unfortunately, Falling Leaf mishaps continued.  In fact, 7 Falling Leaf mishaps 
have occurred since 2000.  Of possible significance, 3 of the 7 aircraft were two-seat 
F/A-18Ds. Clearly, the conclusion of the 1999 recovery procedures testing, that 
“releasing the controls provided very dependable departure recoveries” was overly 
optimistic, if not down right incorrect.  Additionally, the assertion that the Departure 




THE HISTORY OF F/A-18 PROPOSED FLIGHT CONTROL FIXES 
One of the first reports that sought to improve the departure resistance of the 
aircraft was released in 1990.  This investigation was produced by McDonnell Douglas to 
propose FCC changes in response to a Navy request to improve known Falling Leaf 
departure issues with the F/A-18 B/ D aircraft.  Those two-seat aircraft required 
significant AOA limitations above 0.7 Mach number and still were more susceptible to 
departure (NATOPS, prior to IC79).  That 1990 report recommended adding sideslip and 
sideslip rate feedback to FCC gains when responding to pilot roll commands.  The report 
was well received by the NAWCAD engineering community.  However, there was 
substantial resistance from F/A-18 aircrew.  The pilots were concerned that increased 
departure resistance would necessitate reduced high AOA maneuverability and roll 
performance.  NAVAIR interest in support for this program was finally withheld in 1993, 
as funding was re-centered around the development of the Super Hornet Program  
(Heller, 2003). 
F/A-18E/F SOLUTION 
The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet appears to be, and was billed to be, geometrically 
and aerodynamically similar to the original F/A-18A-D Hornet—often referred to as the 
“legacy Hornet”.  However, the E/F FCS was developed with significant funding that 
allowed for several advances to the flight control system.   Fred Madenwald, the senior 
Boeing Test Pilot for the Super Hornet stated in 1997 that a primary goal during the 
Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD) phase of the E/F Super hornet 
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was to suppress the Falling Leaf mode that was prevalent on the original C/D Hornet 
(Madenwald, 1997).  The Super Hornet high AOA design ended up much more advanced 
than what was proposed to cure the Hornet in 1990. 
The airframe and FCC software design changes to the Super Hornet that were 
incorporated to either directly or indirectly delete Falling Leaf departure characteristics 
were: 
1.  Increased Nose-Down Stabilator Travel from 10° nose down to 20° nose 
down. 
2.  Differential Stabilator (Diff-stab) was used as a primary yaw device instead of a 
rolling device at elevated AOA (above 30°): This is because a significant amount of 
adverse yaw is generated by differential deflection of stabilators at greater than 20º AOA. 
The stabilator that is deflected trailing edge down (TED) creates very high induced drag 
on that side, producing yaw opposite the commanded roll.  The Legacy Hornet’s old 
v10.5.1 FCC software used considerable rudder (up to full 30º deflection) to coordinate 
even small lateral stick inputs due to this diff-stab induced adverse yaw.  The old 
software therefore drastically limited roll command gains (diff-stab + aileron) when the 
rudders were saturated, resulting in sluggish roll performance when greater than 30° 
AOA.  However, the E/F was able to achieve greater roll performance (roll rates) at 
elevated AOA by deflecting the differential stabilator opposite to the aileron.  This 
method causes significant yaw moment in the direction that assists the rudder and 
prevents adverse yaw. 
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3.  Sideslip rate feedback was fed back to the FCCs to control Dutch roll mode 
above 20ºAOA.  This signal is derived from pitch and roll angles from the aircraft 
Inertial Navigation System (INS) and computed from a combination of lateral 
acceleration and the integration of sideslip rate.    
4.  Add a software algorithm to the flight controls that serves to provide tailored 
output for the limiting of simultaneous aircraft roll and pitch rates.  This was 
accomplished by supplying added logic that automatically reduces the aircraft’s actual 
roll rate when both pitch and roll rates are too high to avoid cross coupling departure 
regions.  This effectively reduces the gain of lateral stick inputs when combined with 
large or abrupt aft stick longitudinal pilot inputs.  The functionality of this limiter is that 
it gives the pilot the pitch rate or AOA that is commanded with longitudinal stick but at 
the expense of commanded roll rate to prevent aircraft departure. 
 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE LEGACY HORNET FCC OFP UPGRADE SOFTWARE 
The upgraded F/A-18A-D FCC software version that was developed as a result of 
this test program is OFP v10.7.  It was developed in large part by the lessons learned and 
the techniques developed on the Super Hornet F/A-18E/F program.  Much of the 
upgraded legacy Hornet FCC architecture was taken directly from that developed for the 
Super Hornet.  This extensive technology transfer scheme is depicted graphically by the 
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Figure 5.  Flight Control Technology Transfer Timeline between F/A-18A-D and F/A-
18E/F (Wallace, 2003). 
 
 
The FCC software actually used for the majority of the developmental test flight 
program was designated OFP v10.6.1. This software load was a flight worthy version of 
the software used for ground functional and structural mode interaction (SMI) testing 
(v10.6).  The software load was based on existing legacy Hornet v10.5.1 OFP software 
integrated with Super Hornet derived changes that were designed to improve redundancy 
management, increase departure resistance, and improve recovery characteristics from 
out-of-control flight.  Major changes to the OFP included E/F FCS features 2 through 4 
as discussed in the preceding paragraphs. 
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OFP 10.6.1 FEATURES 
The following features were incorporated in v10.6.1 (Heller, 2003): 
1.  Sideslip Rate Feedback:  An accurate estimator of sideslip rate (β dot) can be 
calculated from true airspeed, g, Ny (lateral g), pitch and roll angles and rates, and AOA. 
2.  Sideslip Feedback:  With the production F/A-18A-D lacking a sideslip probe, 
sideslip (β) is calculated by simply integrating the β dot estimate discussed above.   
3.  AOA Estimator >35° AOA:  This estimator presented the highest technical 
risk of the program because it was not previously developed and tested during E/F Super 
Hornet development.  The E/F AOA probes are accurate to 50°AOA by design while the 
F/A-18A-D probes are only valid to 35°.  During Falling Leaf departures, AOA is 
typically 60-70°, well outside the capabilities of either A-D or E/F AOA probes.  
Accurate AOA input was essential to the calculation of sideslip rate, and successful 
suppression of the Falling Leaf was key to program success.   
The concept of using data form the Inertial Navigation System (INS) to compute 
AOA was considered.  However, that would have required a software change to the 
aircraft Mission Computers (MCs) that would have increased the cost and complexity of 
this program immensely. 
Instead, the AOA estimator uses integration of a computed AOA rate signal.  The 
AOA estimator uses actual stabilator position as the driver and uses a “look up table”.   
This method was based on AOA estimation techniques that was developed and is used on 
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the F-15 fighter.  This information required for this AOA estimation already completely 
resided within the FCCs and did not require expensive modification to the MC software.  
Although the F/A-18 is statically unstable in most flight regimes with typical fuel and 
ordnance loads, the aircraft is longitudinally stable at all AOAs above 35º.  The FCS 
control law uses measured AOA below 31º AOA.  When probe AOA reaches 31º, AOA 
selection logic starts to use a blend of probe AOA and the output of the AOA estimator.  
By 33º, the output of the AOA estimator is used as the sole AOA source for the lateral 
and directional axes. 
4.  Air Data Estimator for AOA>30°:  At high AOA, dynamic pressure as 
measured by the Pitot tube is inaccurate.  The estimation is a function of aircraft gross 
weight, Nz, and Cz (normal force). 
5.  Rudder Pedal Gain Change with Airspeed and AOA:  The Hornet is 
susceptible to departure at low airspeed near zero AOA.  Therefore rudder gain 
reductions were tailored in that flight regime. 
6.  Pitch and Roll Inertial Coupling Limiters:  A means of the FCS to respond 
to aggravating simultaneous roll and pitch commands designed to provide improved 
forgiveness for multi-axis control inputs.  Previous OFP v10.5.1 caused severe departures 
with abrupt full application of aft corner stick inputs.  V10.6.1 design initially limits roll 
rate during high pitch rate maneuvers in effort to prevent departures.    
7.  Spin Recovery Arrow Improvements:  Design reduces the commanded anti-
spin aileron at the termination of a spin as the recovery occurs.  This is designed to 
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prevent re-departures in the opposite direction (“progressive spin”) if the anti-spin 
control input is held to long. 
8.  Pirouette Enhancer:  The legacy Hornet pilots have developed a dogfight 
maneuver that capitalizes on the aircraft’s ability to generate controllable sideslip rates to 
rapidly reposition from nose-high to nose-low attitude.  With the addition of β and βdot 
feedback, this maneuver would not work unless there was provision left for it.  This 
“Pirouette logic” function is a means to boost the high AOA roll performance when 
lateral stick and pedal are fully deflected in the same direction.  The software feature is 
designed to provide maximum controllable proverse sideslip commands in cases where 
rapid gross roll acquisition is desired by the pilot.  The “Pirouette logic” essentially 
allowed commanded yaw rates approaching 40°/sec at elevated AOA and moderately low 
airspeeds (less than approximately 250 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS)).  The exact 
functionality and software gains would be adjusted to maximize performance during the 
testing.   
The following is a summary of the high AOA related software changes 
incorporated into v10.6.1: 
 
• Improve AOA maneuvering control Laws (High AOA Update) 
• High Angle of Attack Air Data Estimation 
• Angle of Attack Estimation > 35 deg  
• Spin Logic Update to Eliminate Erroneous Spin Arrows 
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• Angle of Attack Failure Detection and Selection Logic Revisions 
• High AOA Crossfeed Path Structural Filtering 
• DAF Options to revise FCS gain settings during testing if required 
 
In the event that deficiencies were found in the updated v10.6.1 control laws, 
alternate gains were built into the software that could be enabled real-time using a built in 
software feature called “Dial-A-Function (DAF)" that was previously engineered into the 
software.  
For completeness, additional v10.6.1 software changes that were designed to 
enhance FCS functionality, but not related to high AOA maneuverability and departure 
resistance are delineated below: 
 
• MECH Reversion PBIT. 
• PBIT GO Overriding IBIT Degrade. 
• False Switching Valve BLIN and MSP Codes during Engine Shutdown. 
• Eliminate Nuisance IBIT Failures when Atmospheric Pressure is Too High. 
• Eliminate FCS Caution with MC1 Off. 
• ASM LEF Stall Monitor. 
• FLAP SCHED Caution not set for Right Leading Edge Flap in Hinge Moment. 
• LEF Hydraulic Motor Fail Detect Logic Modifications. 
• Throttle Backdrive Monitor Correction for Fast Reengagement. 
• Flight Test Message Definition for F/A-18 A-D FCC OFP V10.6. 
• Aileron / Rudder ASM Updates. 
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• TEF Asymmetry and Three Fail PBIT BLIN Codes. 
• ACLS Changes to Increase Protection from Upstream Failures. 
• Pitch Trim Initialization for PA Autopilot Disengage. 
• Rudder Toe-In Rate Limiter Improvements. 
• PBIT GO Overriding IBIT Degrade – MSP Code Changes. 
• Updated Flight Test Message Definition for High AOA Estimation Update. 
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CHAPTER IV.  FLIGHT TEST PROCEDURES USED TO SAFELY 
CONDUCT OCF AND HIGH AOA TESTING USING 
DEVELOPMENTAL FCC SOFTWARE 
 
OVERVIEW OF TESTING 
A total of sixty-eight test flights were flown by Test and Evaluation Squadron 
TWO-THREE (VX-23) during the development of the FCS upgrades.  Testing was 
initiated in May 2002 with the v10.6.1 developmental software load and the final v10.7 
tests were completed in April 2003.  All developmental flights were conducted in the 
local Patuxent River in-shore restricted areas (Restricted Areas 4006 and R4008) during 
daylight visual metrological conditions (VMC). Testing was conducted in five phases as 
delineated in Table 1 below.  Exclusive use airspace was used for all but Phase 1 flights. 
Chase aircraft were used for all flights, except for the initial instrumentation checkflight.  
In all cases, the chase aircraft was an F/A-18A-D Hornet  flown by another 
developmental test pilot from VX-23 test squadron. The chase aircraft were used as a 
target for operational test points during Phase 4. In some instances, the target/chase 
aircraft were also equipped with FCCs loaded with v10.6.1. However, if the target/chase 
aircraft was equipped with v10.6.1, real-time telemetry from that aircraft was monitored 
by the test team as well.   All test flights were flown by military aircrew assigned to VX-




















 Load-outs (3): FE FE  
w/Aft 
CG 











  1      
1 1 g Stalls, 
WDTs, and 360 
deg Rolls 
3  3     3 
2 OCF Recovery 1  3   1   
3 1 g Stalls, 
WDTs, and 720 
deg Rolls, and 
Multi-Axis 
Inputs 
 1 7 2 1 6 2 1 
3 INS- OFF/ 
Degraded Modes 
Evaluation 
  2      
4 Operational 
Maneuvers 
  2(1)     2 
5 OFP v10.7 Final 
Regression 
Testing(2) 
3 6 2 2 1 1 2 3 
          
 Flight Totals: 7 7 22 4 2 8 4 11 
 
 
Notes:  (1) Operational maneuver flights in the FCL loading included inboard wing pylons. 
 (2) v10.7 testing was accomplished on a separate Test Program than v10.6.1 but spot checked all 
      configurations and test points.   
(3) FE = Fighter escort (Air-to-air (A/A) wingtip missiles only). No wing pylons. 
     FCL = FE plus Centerline External fuel tank (EFT). 
     INT = Interdiction Load (Air to ground (A/G) bombs plus, 2 x EFTs,& self-protection A/A 
missiles. 





pilots were employed by Boeing and were former  military pilots with extensive Hornet 
experience. 
The test and evaluation was performed over several separate test programs: 
ground functional and structural mode interaction tests, developmental flight tests, and 
regression flight tests of the fleet release OFP. There were three separate versions of the 
OFP. The first OFP, V10.6 was used for ground functional and Structural Mode 
Interaction (SMI) testing only. The results of the SMI testing were used to tune software 
structural filters for the second OFP version, v10.6.1, which was used for the 
developmental flight tests.  Problems discovered during developmental testing had 
software fixes incorporated into the third OFP version, v10.7, which was the fifth test 
phase which consisted of regression testing prior to being released to the fleet.  Changes 
from v10.6.1 to v10.7 included: 
 
• Inadvertent Spin Mode Engagement Due to Lateral Stick Movement. 
• INS Monitor Trips Due to Slow MUX Communication. 
• Re-Departures during Spin Recovery. 
• Inaccurate Estimated AOA with Stores. 
• Pedal Sensitive during Guns Tracking. 
• Departure during Roll with 6K ft-lbs Asymmetry. 
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• Additional MUX Variables - HIAOA Advisory & Incident Data. 
 
 
TEST SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS 
General Modifications to the Aircraft 
It was ultimately decided that the primary aircraft for this testing would be an 
F/A-18D model.  This was due to the increased departure susceptibility of the two-place 
canopy configuration.   The aircraft (Bureau Number 163434, known as Salty Dog 120) 
was equipped with a Digital Data Acquisition System (DDAS) instrumentation system.   
For this test program SD 120 was modified with several rather low cost systems for this 
test.  These included an Over-the-Shoulder (OTS) video system, yaw rate and AOA 
gauges on the glare-shield, and a fuselage chin mounted sideslip vane. The location of the 
AOA and yaw rate gauges on the top of the glareshield is depicted in figure 6. The AOA 
gauge used a blend of AOA probe and INS derived AOA, which are the same sources of 
information as displayed on the HUD. The yaw rate gauge displayed INS yaw rate. The 
yaw rate gauge was fixed to the right side and the AOA gauge was on the left.  Finally, a 
modification was completed to provide isolated signals from the flight control system to 
the instrumentation system for precise flight control surface position data. 
Additionally, a pilot chest restraint strap was installed on the ejection seat in the 
forward cockpit of the test aircraft. This strap was designed to provide the pilot with 





Figure 6.  Front Cockpit AOA and Yaw Rate Gauge Locations. 
 
adversely affect the pilot’s performance of cockpit duties nor ejection seat operation or 
procedures. 
To compliment testing in SD120, a single seat aircraft was also used to verify the 
single place canopy configuration compatibility with the new FCC software.  Both 
aircraft used for this test program were equipped with a yaw string attached on the 
centerline of the forward fuselage, forward of the windscreen and within view of the 
pilot.   
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Additionally, the Amplifier-Control-Intercommunications (ACI) panel was 
modified to provide the aircrew with control of FCC generated AOA/Yaw Rate tone 
volume. This feature allowed these normally very loud warning tones to be attenuated 
sufficiently to allow continuous and uninterrupted communication between the pilot and 
the test team and chase aircraft. 
No Spin Chute Nor Other Typical Spin Test Risk Mitigators 
Traditionally, high AOA and OCF developmental flight testing has required the 
use of an additional spin recovery chute (SRC) mounted on the tail of the aircraft for 
emergency recovery if normal recovery methods fail.  A SRC was developed for the F/A-
18 during the early development of the aircraft.  The SRC system developed by the Navy 
was transferred to Edwards Air Force Base for NASA’s use on their highly modified  
High α Research Vehicle (HARV) F/A-18.  Photos of the SRC as installed on an F/A-18 
are presented as Figure 7. 
The VX-23 v10.7 Test Team considered the addition of either this original SRC 
or modifying the newer SRC developed for the Super Hornet.  However, the team was 
concerned that SRC package weight and aerodynamic affects would interfere with test 
results.  Additionally, the increased cost associated with that addition was a strong 
negative.  After carefully application of the other risk mitigators added to the program the 
test team elected to forego the SRC.  
 Interestingly, after the testing of the NASA High α aircraft, NASA concluded that 








spent on research tasks had the SRC been removed form the aircraft” (Bowers, 1996). 
 
Engine Damage Risk Mitigation 
Although the track record of the GE F404 engine in the Hornet is very good at 
extremely high AOA, the Team considered the use of an Emergency Power Backup 
System (EPBS) to provide battery power sufficient for flight control surface hydraulic 
power in the event of a dual engine flameout.  This type of system was used in the F/A-
18E/F Development as well as NASA’s HARV.  
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Again, the team elected to use other available risk mitigation to manage the risk 
of dual engine failure.  To prevent or reduce compressor rub during out of control flight, 
pitch, roll, and yaw rate limits were imposed during departures resulting from tailslides, 
spin maneuvers, MSRM Falling Leaf, and aggravated input maneuvers. The rate limits 
were pitch rate of ± 86°/sec, roll rate of ±200°/sec, and yaw rate ±115°/sec during 
departures. 
If any of these limits was exceeded, the test flight would have been aborted and 
the aircraft would return to base (RTB) for engine borescope inspection. Post flight data 
analysis by propulsion engineers and the results of the borescope would determine if any 
additional engine inspections were required.  Although the test engines were groomed for 
this program, several self-recovering pop stalls were detected during spin maneuvers. 
TEST ENVELOPE 
Testing was performed within NATOPS limits except as authorized by the 
NAVAIR flight clearance that was obtained prior to testing. Table 2 contains two-place 
and loading specific AOA and center of gravity (CG) limits as authorized by this flight 
clearance, along with the corresponding NATOPS limits.   
FLIGHT CLEARANCE ISSUES 
All Navy flight test programs that modify avionics software, especially FCS 




Angle of Attack Limits. 
 
Aircraft Configuration Flight Clearance Limits NATOPS Limits (NATOPS, 2003) 
Fighter Escort Unrestricted with center of 
gravity (CG) 17 to 25.5% 
MAC 
Unrestricted with CG 17 to 25% 
MAC 
Fighter Escort with 
Centerline Tank 
Unrestricted with CG 17 to 
24% MAC 
Unrestricted with CG 17 to 23.5% 
MAC 
Fighter Escort with 
inboard wing tanks 
-10 deg to 40 deg with CG 17 
to 24.5 % MAC 
-6 deg to 35 deg with CG 17 to 24% 
MAC 
Interdiction Unrestricted with lateral or 
pedal inputs to maintain bank 
angle only, with CG 17% to 
24% MAC,  
otherwise –10 deg to 30 deg  
-6 deg to 20 deg with CG 17 to 27% 
MAC 
Up to 8,000 ft-lb lateral 
asymmetry 
Unrestricted -6 deg to 20 deg 
Up to 12,000 ft-lb lateral 
asymmetry(1) 
-6 deg to 25 deg -6 deg to 20 deg 
Two-place specific limits Unrestricted -6 to 20 deg from 0.7 to 0.8 Mach 
-6 to 15 deg from 0.8 to 0.9 Mach 
-6 to 12 deg above 0.9 Mach  
Note: (1) After the two place testing in loadings FCL and 6KASYM was completed, the remainder of the test points for 





Clearance.  Also, Flight Clearance is required to deviate from an applicable NATOPS 
Operators Manual.  Therefore, a local NAVAIR Flight Clearance was obtained for the 
flight test instrumentation, cockpit analog yaw rate and AOA indicators, sideslip chin 
vane, pilot chest restraint, and the modified ACI panel.  
Additionally, a NAVAIR Flight Clearance was obtained for the following items:  
 Flight with FCC V10.6.1 and V10.7 OFP loaded in the FCC's. 
 Clearance to perform testing within the AOA limits in table XX. 
Also, clearance to perform the following maneuvers prohibited in the NATOPS 
Operators Manual was obtained: 
 Intentional departures and zero airspeed tail slides. 
 Zero g for up to 15 seconds during tail slides and 100 knot vertical 
recoveries. 
 Intentional selection of the spin recovery switch to the RCVY position in 
controlled flight (below 250 KCAS). 
 Intentional maneuvers with yaw rates in excess of 25°/sec. The maximum 
target yaw rate shall be 90°/sec. 
 Full or partial stick aileron rolls up to 720° bank angle change (to verify 
Blue Angels Flight Demonstration Maneuvers. 
 In-flight engagement of DAF. 
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 Negative g for up to 30 seconds with throttles MIL power or less. 
 AOA unrestricted at or above 0.7 Mach number in the two place aircraft, 
except for the above loading specific limits. 
Specific limits included in the NAVAIR Flight clearance that applied during FCC 
OFP developmental testing only included: 
 All high AOA/high yaw rate maneuvering or intentional departures shall 
be conducted with less then 100 lb of fuel in each external fuel tank. 
 Minimum altitude for intentional departures is 30,000 ft above ground 
level AGL (however, all testing was actually accomplished over water). 
Additionally, the following alternate recovery inputs were authorized in case an 
intentional departure failed to recover using normal recovery procedures: 
• If OCF below 20,000 ft and 12,000 ft has been lost during the departure, 
full aft stick may be applied. 
• If OCF below 10,000 ft, MAX A/B may be selected. 
• Pilot selection of MSRM if lateral stick with arrow in ASRM does not 
recover from a spin.  
• If aerodynamic controls are insufficient to effect recovery from a spin, 
asymmetric thrust may be used. 
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• If still out of control below 10,000 ft, the pilot may select FCS gain 
override. 
• If INS attitude angles errors are suspected, the attitude selector switch may 
be set to STBY. 
• Authorization to restart an engine for landing, which had been shut down 
following an engine stall during a departure maneuver, provided that 
transient temperature limits were not exceeded. 
The product of sideslip and dynamic pressure shall be monitored real time for all 
intentional departures and spins and shall not exceed +/- 5500 lb/ft2. 
For all intentional departures and spins of aircraft configured with stores the root 
mean square of roll and yaw rates shall be less than 220°/sec when carrying air-to-air 
stores, and less than 150°/sec when carrying air-to-ground stores. 
TEST LOADINGS 
The aircraft was weighed and the longitudinal, lateral, and vertical locations of 
the CG were determined. In general, testing was performed with fleet representative 
center of gravity locations. Ten test points were performed in the fighter escort (FE) 
loadout while in an aft CG condition. For the aft CG test points, the test aircraft was 
ballasted so that the CG was at the NATOPS aft limit with 2,000 lb of internal fuel. In 
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this condition, the CG was aft of the nominal CG location as fuel is used during the 
flight, but remained just within NATOPS limits. 
METHOD OF TESTS 
Test Method and Procedures 
Before any testing started with the upgraded OFP, a flight with V10.5.1 was 
flown to checkout the flight test instrumentation, the FCS rigging, and the suitability of 
the radome for maneuvers at HI AOA. Also, baseline data for HI AOA roll performance 
was collected during the checkout flight. 
Testing of the upgraded FCC OFP 10.6.1 was evaluated during four phases. 
Departure resistance to single-axis inputs was evaluated during Phase 1 and no departures 
were performed.  OCF flight recovery characteristics were evaluated during Phase 2 
while the aircraft inertial navigation system (INS) was operating normally and while it 
was disabled. After the recovery characteristics were verified, departure resistance to 
aggravated inputs was evaluated during Phase 3.  Additionally during Phase 3, the effects 
of AOA failures on flying qualities and departure resistance was evaluated. Flying 
qualities during operational maneuvers were evaluated during Phase 4. Detailed test 
method descriptions and a detailed description of the buildup process are presented in 
appendix A.  
Due to the risk of high angle of attack testing, manned and off-line simulation was 
used extensively to mitigate the risk of the program. The off line sim was a PC based, 
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Boeing developed, Modular Six-Degree-of-Freedom simulation.  Off-line simulation was 
used to generate predicted trajectories for each maneuver. The test team used these 
predictions during test flights and compared them with actual results. High risk and high 
workload test points (test Phases 1 though 3) were practiced in the Manned Flight 
Simulator (MFS) facility at NAWCAD.  Many hours of MFS testing was used during this 
program.  The MFS’s data link capability was used to provide real-time simulated flight 
data to the test team (over 3 miles away) at ground control room, known as the Real-
Time Telemetry Processing Stations (RTPS).  This functionality allowed the test team to 
rehearse test missions using the same strip chart and graphical displays that were used 
during flights.   
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 
 Flight Briefing  
The Test Conductor (TC) and the test team that supported the test flights at RTPS 
conducted a thorough flight brief approximately 2 hours prior to the start of the scheduled 
takeoff time.  Emphasis of the flight brief was on test procedures, expected performance, 
emergency, and safety considerations.  Applicable test team communications were 
reviewed for both normal and emergency procedures for each flight. Flight test cards, 
which detailed communications, flight profiles, test parameters, and the sequence of 
events, were provided to the pilot and the rest of the test team the day prior to a flight.     
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Test Profiles  
Each test flight followed a similar administrative flight profile.  After ground 
checks (NATOPS, control sweeps, and Manual Spin Recovery Mode check), taxi 
(including yaw rate gauge check) and takeoff was accomplished.  After transiting to the 
R4006/R4008 inshore restricted area, the Phasing maneuver, g-awareness maneuver, and 
wind calibration in climb were accomplished prior to performing the test points. 
Go/ No-Go Criteria  
The following items were considered go/no-go: 
• Chase aircraft (except for the instrumentation checkflight) and Search and 
Rescue (SAR) support. 
• Ground Tracking mount video coverage for Phase 2 test flights. 
• RTPS telemetry room operational. 
• Hot mike telemetry available at RTPS. 
• Good weather, clear of clouds, discernable horizon, and view of ground. 
• Cockpit Video Recording System operational. 
In addition, the following items were considered go/no-go for the two seat 
aircraft: 
• Chest restraint required during Phase 2. 
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• Glareshield yaw rate analog gauges for all flights during Phases 1, 2, 3, 
and 5 flights. 
• ICS if the aft cockpit was occupied. 
Lastly, any malfunction or situation that the aircrew determined as unsafe 
constituted a No-Go situation. Any downing discrepancy as defined by NATOPS or local 
Standard Operating Procedures (VX-23 SOP, 2003) constituted a No-Go situation.   
Real-time Data Monitoring Plan 
Specific real-time monitoring requirements were detailed in the test planning 
documents and are listed in Appendix C. Additionally, to ensure that critical information 
was provided to the test aircrew in a timely manner, critical test team members were 
identified with specific real-monitor monitoring responsibilities. In general, the plan 
directed that each critical test team member was responsible for identifying specific 
“knock-it-off” (KIO) or emergency conditions, and provided information to the test 
conductor, as required. The test conductor then relayed that information to the test pilot. 
The only exception were “Knock-it-off” calls to prevent an impending departure. For this 
case, the flying qualities engineers provided KIO calls directly to the pilot, limited to 
either "Recover – Yaw rate” or “Recover – Sideslip”. All other information was 
channeled through the test conductor. To ensure that the critical members of the test team 
maintained familiarity with KIO and emergency procedures, each critical test team 
member had an initial simulation qualification and was required to maintain currency. 
For the initial simulation qualification, that member practiced all of the emergency 
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procedures related to their role. Project aircrew, test conductors, and flying qualities 
engineers either participated in a simulation session or a test flight within 14 calendar 
days to maintain currency. Flight control and propulsion engineers either participated in a 
simulation session or a test flight within 30 calendar days to maintain currency.   
Alternate OCF Recovery Procedures 
Looking at the numbers of aircraft lost to OCF over the years, it was apparent the 
published NATOPS recovery procedures were not as effective as desired.  As this test 
was attempting to put the aircraft into situations that caused Falling Leaf departures in 
v10.5.1 software, concern that v10.6.1 Falling Leaf suppression might be ineffective led 
the team to plan and rehearse alternate recovery procedures.  This would preclude having 
the pilot simply release the controls (per the NATOPS departure procedures) and 
passively wait all 35,000 ft as the jet fell to earth.   Previous OCF testing in 2000 as well 
as some Fleet mishap data suggested that other techniques had merit and were added as 
authorized recovery procedures for this testing.  These techniques included applying full 
aft stick and selecting full afterburner, and are detailed in Appendix B.    
Cost of the FCC Development Flight Testing 
Table 3 contains a list of the estimated Navy costs for this test program. These 





Table 3.  
 Total Cost Breakdown for All FCC Developmental and Regression Testing  










$219,000 $182,000  
Project support $40,000 $29,000  
Aircraft 
Preparation 
$113,000 $32,000 Aircraft instrumentation, test 




$153,000 $48,000 Software development and real-




$34,000 $10,000 Video coverage of OCF flights 
Aircraft Ground 
Usage 




$1,888.000 $603,000 F/A-18 test aircraft and chase 
flight hours 
 $367,000 $95,000 KC-130 Tanker hours 




CHAPTER V.   TEST RESULTS  
 
FLIGHT TESTING RESULTS 
Departure Resistance Testing 
The combined v10.6.1 and 10.7 test program consisted of approximately 600 
specific test points.  These included 400 rolls, 48 spins, and 63 tailslides.  Significantly, 
more tailslides were done in this development program than were accomplished in the 
entire three-year F/A-18E/F development program (Swanson, 2003). 
During flight testing, the OFP v10.6.1/10.7 AOA estimator output was compared 
to the presumably more accurate INS derived AOA.  Test data verified the accuracy of 
the estimation method with satisfactory results. Throughout this program, the Falling 
Leaf mode was successfully suppressed.  That result, in and of itself made the program a 
tremendous success. 
However, during initial testing of 10.6.1 (test phases 1 through 4), several 
deficiencies were present.  Examination of the flight data during post-departure gyrations 
indicated that automatic spin recovery mode (ASRM) was inadvertently engaged if the 
stick moved left or right due to initial forces while a ASRM command arrow was present. 
 The Test Team was surprised to observe lateral stick deflections greater than one inch 
during violent post stall gyrations in the two seat aircraft. When ASRM was engaged by 
this uncommanded lateral stick activity, all feedback to the FCS was removed.  This 
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included the very important sideslip and sideslip rate feedbacks.  This served to negate 
the effectiveness of this upgrade, and delay departure recovery.   
An additional FCS deficiency not related to Falling Leaf type departures (but 
OCF related) was that the aircraft would occasionally re-depart after a spin recovery.  
The software pertaining to ASRM was modified to more quickly disarm the spin mode 
when yaw rate stopped.   
Lastly, several non-OCF related deficiencies were found in 10.6.1 and addressed 
successfully in v10.7.  Rudder inputs were found to be too sensitive at high AOA for 
predictable guns tracking.  Additionally, accurate INS information to the FCCs was 
lagging due to slow updates on the aircraft’s Multiplex Bus (MUX Bus). 
Based on the 10.6.1 test results phases 1 through 4, the following changes were 
incorporated into v10.7: 
a)  The lateral stick deflection threshold for spin recovery mode engagement was 
increased from approximately 0.3 to 0.75 inches.  This change successfully 
inhibited incorrectly engaging ASRM due to all but the highest inertial 
lateral forces on the stick(s).  
b)  The INS monitor logic was changed to compensate for MUX bus 
communication delays. 
c)  The spin recovery mode disengagement threshold was reduced to when yaw 
rates were less than 17 deg/sec. 
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d)  A nonlinear pedal gradient was added to reduce rudder pedal sensitivity 
during tracking maneuvers at high AOA. 
e)  Sideslip and sideslip rate feedback gains were increased around 30° AOA at 
speeds from 0.8 to 0.9 Mach number. 
Creation of OFP v10.7 after the testing of v10.6.1 software was a preplanned part 
of the software developmental process.  This iterative software building process assured 
that discovered deficiencies could be rectified quickly.  All of the listed issues in v10.6.1 
were addressed in v10.7.  Subsequent regression testing followed.  All noted OCF 
departure related discrepancies were successfully resolved. 
Roll Performance Results 
The roll performance of the aircraft at elevated AOA was found to be 
significantly improved over v10.5.1.  This increase is presented graphically in Figure 8. 
As an example from the figure, at 40° AOA, the old v10.5.1 aircraft had very little 
roll capability at all.  The aircraft felt sluggish and rather unpredictable in roll forcing the 
pilot to reduce or limit AOA to maneuver.  With v10.7 however, roll rates were 
predictable and usable at 15-25°/sec.  Pilot comments were very positive.  The figure 
further shows that roll rates of over 20°/sec are possible at very high AOA with v10.7 up 
to essentially full longitudinal aft stick sustained AOAs of 50-55º.  Lastly, the 




Figure 8.  F/A-18A-D Time to Roll 90 Deg at High AOA with  FCC OFP 10.7 vs. OFP 
10.5.1 (Adapted from Heller, 2003). 
 
progressively higher lateral aircraft response with the addition of coordinated rudder 
pedal.  Although not unusual for most aircraft to exhibit (classically referred to as 
dihedral affect), the functionality was not mechanized in v10.5.1 software. 
Previously, the Hornet did not roll well at high AOA (> 30° AOA).  Legacy 
Hornet pilots had discovered that cross control inputs (e.g., lateral stick in opposite 
direction of rudder input and desired roll direction) could increase roll performance 
during maneuver at high AOA.  Analysis indicated that these cross control inputs 
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produced proverse sideslip, which combined with the natural tendency of the aircraft to 
roll away from sideslip at high AOA, improved roll performance.   
Although the Hornet has had a great reputation as a “pitch pointer” that could use 
high AOA excursions to its benefit, v10.7 provides additional capability to effectively 
command roll and yaw at extreme AOA where the “old Hornet” could only pitch. The 
v10.7 FCS high AOA sideslip control law designers created provided the pilot direct 
control over sideslip at elevated AOA, with the sum of coordinated rudder and lateral 
stick as the controller.  For this control law, full rudder pedal input is equal to 3 inches of 
lateral stick.  At high AOA, combined inputs (sum of lateral stick and rudder) less than 3 
inches are pure roll commands.  Any combined command that is greater than 3 inches 
introduces a bias signal into the sideslip feedback path, creating what is essentially 
commanded sideslip.  This resulting sideslip produces an increase in roll rate via dihedral 
effect. 
  During v10.7 evaluation flights by the author, the aircraft maneuverability with 
v10.7 was truly eye-watering.  The author found that “simple performance graphs do not 
do the new maneuvering capability justice…the high AOA roll and yaw capabilities now 
are so astounding that after the flights, one must be careful not to attempt to describe 
them with your hands, or you risk breaking your wrist” (Mitchell, 2003).   
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CHAPTER VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Adequacy of the AOA and Sideslip Estimators 
Real time comparison of the AOA and sideslip estimators with truth data 
computations derived from inertial data were displayed in the control room and 
constantly monitored during testing.  The comparisons were consistent and acceptable in 
all flight conditions.  From a performance standpoint, the measure of effectiveness of the 
estimators was the successful suppression of Falling Leaf motion.  Immediate damping of 
residual oscillations after high AOA peaks during tailslide testing proved that the 
estimators functioned satisfactorily. 
 
Adequacy of the Risk Mitigation During the Test Program 
The use of simulation to rehearse the flight benefited not only the test pilots, but 
also the entire Test Team.  The planned test sequence carefully selected by the team and 
reviewed by the Test Coordination Team during the extensive test planning stages was 
effective in overall risk mitigation. 
The most significant surprise that occurred was the uncommanded lateral stick 
movements encountered.  In response to this, the test team ceased testing and “stood-
down” for a week to review data and formulate a solution (David, 2004).  This was an 
excellent example of good risk mitigation in response to an unexpected result.   
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Decision to Test Without a Spin Recovery Chute (SRC) nor Emergency Power 
Backup System (EPBS) 
After evaluating the risks associated with this testing, the v10.7 Test Team 
deleted the requirement for traditional SRC and EPBS equipment.  They utilized 
Operational Risk Management (ORM) techniques and found ways to mitigate risk that 
were effective.  This resulted in a cost efficient, yet safe and successful flight test 
program.  Although a rather expensive test program, it should be noted that the nearly $4 
million total cost estimate for this test program is approximately ten percent of the cost of 
a single F/A-18C/D aircraft. 
Departure Susceptibility and High AOA Maneuvering Capability of OFP v10.7 
The 10.7 test team efficiently planned and executed a challenging test program 
and provided the Navy with a revised F/A-18A-D FCS that enhances the maneuverability 
and reduces departure susceptibility.  Additionally, the v10.7 software is apparently very 
effective at suppressing the dangerous sustained Falling Leaf mode after a departure 
occurs.  However, more time and Fleet operational flying with the new software is 
required before that can be determined with certainty. 
Based on the historical data regarding Hornet mishap rates, it is clear to the author 
that if this initial test data is proved accurate and correct, this flight control enhancement 




Future Training Program Still Required to Minimize OCF 
Concern is justified that operational pilots may overestimate the capabilities of 
the new FCS software.  OPF 10.7 does not prevent departures nor make the aircraft 
“bulletproof”.  Pilot errors that cause OCF departures at low altitude will still lead to the 
loss of the aircraft.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recently, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld challenged the military to 
reduce the military mishap rate by 50 percent in the next two years.  “This software will 
be a major benefit to the fleet and should greatly reduce the number of mishaps resulting 
form out-of-control flight incidents,” said Admiral (Select) Jeff Wieringa, former Navy 
F/A-18 Program Manager (Boeing News Release, June 2003).  The danger is that pilots 
will push the aircraft even harder or disregard training rules to win at any cost.  The 
potential for a substantial reduction in OCF related Hornet mishaps would only be 
realized if training is effective and a proper safety culture in the Fleet is maintained.  
Historically, 64% of all Naval aircraft mishaps were the result of “Skill Based Error”, 
otherwise known as “Human Error” (Naval Safety Center, 2004).  Therefore, an effective 
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APPENDIX A:  DETAILED METHOD OF TEST 
 
GENERAL TEST APPROACH 
The flight testing that was conducted during this program was sequenced and 
prioritized to provide the safest and most efficient buildup to the different phases in an 
attempt to most effectively accomplish the objectives. The majority of the testing was 
focused on evaluating the updated controls at flight conditions where the modified 
control laws are active.  However, all phases of flight were spot checked as well.  The 
detailed method of test discussed in this appendix has been adapted from the VX-23 Test 
Plans (David, 2002 and 2003) as well as lessons learned by the team during the test 
program. 
The approach was split into four phases during OFP v10.6.1 testing.  Phase 1 
consisted of controlled flying qualities maneuvers to verify aircraft flying qualities.  
Those maneuvers consisted of 1 g stalls, wind-down-turns (WUTs), break turns, lateral 
stick plus rudder pedal rolls, lateral stick only rolls, and rudder pedal only rolls.  No 
intentional departure maneuvers were planned for this phase. Phase 2 assessed and 
confirmed the recovery characteristics of the aircraft from known high altitude OCF 
situations such as tail-slides, spins and falling leafs using controlled buildup entries. 
Confirming the OCF recovery characteristics from fully developed OCF modes during 
Phase 2 provided buildup for the maneuvers that were conducted during Phase 3. Phase 3 
maneuvers were either predicted to result in OCF or could unintentionally result in OCF. 
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Phase 3 evaluated aircraft departure resistance with actual departure maneuvers, as well 
as test departure resistance and recovery characteristics in the INS off mode and with 
AOA failures.  Phase 4 consisted of operational types of tactical maneuvers including 
flat, rolling, and vertical scissors.  Phase 5 was OFP v10.7 regression testing. 
PLANNING FOR PROBLEMS 
 In the event the minor problems with the OFP were found during testing, Dial-a-
function (DAF) options for minor changes to the control laws had been incorporated into 
the OFP. If a deficiency was found during testing that a DAF option may correct, the 
software gain change would be first evaluated in simulation, then a flight clearance for 
the option would be requested and then that overall test plan would be amended. 
TWO PLACE BUILDUP APPROACH 
Testing in the single place aircraft in the FCL loading, and in the two place 
aircraft in the FCL, 6KASYM, and 12KASYM loadings were required to clear the two 
place placarded region. The Hornet aerodynamic simulation database, which is used to 
generate predictions of expected results, is known to be inaccurate for the single place 
clean aircraft at high angles of attack above 0.6 Mach number. Predictions for the two 
place aircraft with a centerline tank were inaccurate as well, since these effects are 
modeled with increments off of the single place clean aircraft. To evaluate the 
aerodynamic database and to provide buildup for the two place aircraft in loading FCL, 
lateral stick rolls were performed in the single place FCL loading during phase 1. This 
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was the only testing performed in the single place aircraft with the wing pylons removed. 
Since the aerodynamic effects of wing pylons are not well understood, removing the 
pylons removed one unknown for evaluating the aerodynamic database. After the 
accuracy of the database was evaluated against the single place aircraft and any updates 
are incorporated, predictions were generated for the two place aircraft in the FCL 
loading, and lateral stick rolls were performed during phase 3. 
The envelope that was cleared for the two place aircraft with 12,000 ft-lb lateral 
asymmetry loadings was based on the test results of the two place aircraft in loadings 
FCL and 6KASYM, and the predictions for the 12KASYM loading. The current database 
predicted violent departures and probable structure overloads for the two place aircraft in 
the 12,000 ft-lb loading at 0.9 Mach number and 20° AOA. During a previous flight test 
program, a two place aircraft with 11,200 ft-lb of lateral asymmetry departed during a 
lateral stick roll at 20° AOA. After the lateral stick rolls in the two place aircraft were 
performed in the FCL loading and the database was updated and predictions for the two 
place aircraft in the 12KASYM loading were generated. The team then used those 
predictions to determine how much of the envelope could be cleared and the team 
submitted a test plan amendment with the finalized buildup approach for the 12KASYM 
loading. 
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STANDARD TEST PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES 
The following procedures were performed in conjunction with each flight as 
specified.  Along with these procedures, a historical database of the preflight data values 
obtained from the preflight listings was maintained. 
Preflight Procedures  
Preflight of the instrumentation was accomplished prior to each flying day by the 
instrumentation personnel.  Normal preflight activities included recorder checks, TM 
checks, Instrumentation BIT, and preflight listings.  The null measurements were taken 
after the aircraft was set up to standard conditions, as defined in aircraft preflight 
checklists, so that parameter preflight references were consistent from day to day. 
Hangar Initialization Record 
A 30 second hangar initialization record was recorded using the on-board 
instrumentation data tape during preflight procedures.  These were performed in the 
hangar with the engines off, no airflow in the ECS or the engine bleed ducts, and with no 
avionics cooling supplied.  This information was used for instrumentation initialization 
and validation for each flight.   
 
 59  
Control Cycles 
Full throw cycling of the flight controls were performed and recorded on the onboard 
instrumentation data tape as part of the pre-taxi procedures.  These operations were used for 
telemetry parameter verification and post-flight instrumentation/data measurand validation.  
If half stick or half pedal maneuvers were planned for the flight, the pilot also practiced half 
stick inputs with the Test Conductor critiquing each input.  
 
MSRM Ground Check 
Ground check of the manual spin recovery system was accomplished by the pilot 
with engines running on flights that planned to use MSRM.  The pilot selected MSRM and 
checked that leading edge flaps drove to 34º, trailing edge flaps drove to 0º, and the spin 
mode display appears on the DDI. 
Cockpit Analog Yaw Rate Gauge Taxi Check 
The cockpit analog yaw rate gauge was operationally checked with a hard turn 
during taxi prior to flight.  The turn verified that the direction and magnitude of yaw rate 
indicated was correct.  
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Phasing Maneuver 
A phasing maneuver was performed and recorded on the onboard data tape shortly 
after takeoff and prior to beginning in-flight tests.  This phasing maneuver served as a final 
check of the ground station and onboard data system polarities.  The maneuver consists of 
the following consecutive control inputs: 
Partial left stick input to achieve approximately 30 deg left wing down. 
Partial right stick input to achieve approximately 30 deg right wing down. 
Partial left rudder (aircraft nose left). 
Partial right rudder (aircraft nose right). 
Left and right throttle bodes 
Aft stick (2g pull up). 
Forward stick (-1.0 g push over).  
G Awareness Maneuver  
A g awareness maneuver was performed prior to beginning test maneuvers on flights 
that required load factors in excess of 4 g’s.  The maneuver was performed above 10,000 ft 
above ground level (AGL) and consisted of a 4 g turn for 90 degrees of heading change, 
followed by 6 g’s for another 90 degrees of heading change. 
SPECIAL SAFETY PROCEDURES 
Due to the unique nature of departure resistance and departure recovery testing, 
special safety procedures and considerations were followed, including: 
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1. All of the intentional departures were performed in the two place aircraft 
to clear intentional departures in the single place aircraft. The two place 
aircraft was equipped with a pilot chest restraint and cockpit analog 
gauges for AOA and yaw rate. The chest restraint was used when 
intentional departures are planned. Tailslides were only performed in the 
single place aircraft after the two place aircraft previously cleared them.  
 
2. When available, project pilots occupied the aft cockpit of the two seat 
aircraft during Phases 1, 2, and 3 for currency and test continuity.  
 
3. Entry and knock-it-off (KIO) criteria for test points were briefed before 
each flight. KIO communication procedures will be practiced during 
every pre-flight brief. Both NATOPS and the alternate recovery 
procedures listed in appendix B were briefed prior to each flight. 
 
4. All high risk or high workload test maneuvers were practiced in the 
Manned Flight Simulator (MFS) prior to being performed in-flight. 
Emergency procedures that were developed using the manned simulator 
were practiced and refined on a periodic basis, to remain familiar and 
proficient with anticipated aircraft response and normal and emergency 
procedures. 
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5. Predictions were generated for all test maneuvers during phases 1, 2, and 
3. The test team used these predictions to monitor trends in AOA and 
Mach number. Examples of parameters that were monitored real-time 
included sideslip, roll rate, and yaw rate, and errors between estimated 
and INS derived AOA and sideslip. Members of the test team  used 
experiences from simulation practice and engineering judgment to 
determine if the next test point should be attempted.  
 
6. All flights were conducted in daylight Visual Meteorological Conditions 
(VMC) with a discernable horizon above 5,000 ft. to test altitude with a 
clear view of the ground.  Additionally, unobstructed visibility to obtain 
ground video tracking of the aircraft was required during Phase 2. 
 
7. Lateral weight asymmetry was monitored during flight, with no 
maneuvers initiated with asymmetries beyond those identified for each 
phase of testing. The longitudinal location of CG was monitored during 
the flight to ensure that all maneuvers were performed within the 
clearance limits. 
 
8. Standard and consistent terminology was used for test conduct.  TM 
room to aircraft radio transmissions followed an “ACTION - REASON” 
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format.  The “action” element will direct the pilot to take an action as 
appropriate for the situation, such as terminating maneuvering and 
returning the aircraft to straight/level flight (“recover”), reducing power 
to IDLE (“throttles IDLE”), or inputting a recovery control (“stick 
right”). The “reason” will be added when appropriate to clarify the cause 
for the action, such as “sideslip”, “yaw rate”, “loads”, or “engine stall”. 
Anticipated KIO calls are presented in appendix B as well.  
 
9. Throttles remained fixed (or brought to IDLE) for all maneuvers except 
as specified in the maneuver description, such as asymmetric thrust. 
Engine parameters were monitored during all testing. If the propulsion 
engineer observed a pop stall that clears without any action by the pilot 
(self-recovering pop stall), the maneuver would be allowed to continue. 
These are of short duration and may or may not be noticeable to the 
aircrew and do not result in any damage.  If the aircrew observed a stall, 
the throttles would be retarded to IDLE and the maneuver terminated. If 
the stall clears, the propulsion engineer will analyze the engine data and 
determine if testing may continue. If the stall cannot be attributed to a 
known condition, the aircraft will RTB. For hung stalls, defined as stalls 
that do not clear after the throttles are moved to IDLE, the affected 
engine would be secured and the aircraft returned to base IAW 
NATOPS.  If temperature transient limits were not exceeded, the pilot 
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may re-start the engine prior to landing.  If temperature transient limits 
were exceeded for any stall event, the pilot would RTB for 
precautionary hot section inspection.  Engine history and component life 
data from the pool of available engines was studied to ensure selection 
of healthy engines for the test aircraft.  Engines were borescoped prior to 
the start of testing to document baseline engine condition.  Any 
replacement engine will also be borescoped prior to testing. 
 
10. To reduce the possibility of an engine flameout due to fuel starvation, 
the feed tanks were verified to be full of fuel before all negative g 
maneuvers, with at least one minute with positive load factor between 
negative g maneuvers. 
 
11. NATOPS recovery procedures were to be used during both intentional 
and unintentional departures. However, if NATOPS recovery procedures 
failed to recover the aircraft, alternate recovery procedures were 
identified and were briefed prior to each flight. Alternate recovery 
procedures are presented in appendix B. Included in the alternate 
recovery procedures were the use of asymmetric thrust to recover from 
spins and the selection of maximum afterburner during delayed 
recoveries from sustained Falling Leaf departures. However, the use of 
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thrust to assist recovery was only to be attempted after sustained 
aerodynamic recovery controls have proven ineffective. 
 
12. If a FCS failure occurred or a Master Caution annunciated during a 
maneuver, the maneuver was to be aborted. If a FCS failure occurred 
during a departure, the flight controls engineer would examine the FCS 
display and make an advisory call to the pilot on whether or not a FCS 
reset should be attempted.  
 
13. Recovery controls were to be initiated by at least 25,000 ft AGL for 
maneuvers started at 35,000 ft AGL and above. If the aircraft departed 
controlled flight during any maneuver initiated below 35,000 ft Hp, 
recovery controls were to be applied immediately. 
 
14. The pilot will eject if dive recovery is not indicated by 6,000 ft AGL. 
 
15. For the purposes of this test, the aircraft will have departed controlled 
flight if the aircraft does not respond to pilot inputs. The following are 
examples of departures: the aircraft motion is uncommanded (aircraft 
rolls opposite pilot input), the aircraft does not roll in the direction 
commanded by the pilot, or the aircraft diverges in yaw. 
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FLIGHT TEST PROCEDURES 
The maneuvers described below were flown to collect the desired data to satisfy 
the objectives of this test plan.  
 Due to the potential for rapid altitude and energy loss during HI AOA 
maneuvering, unless otherwise specified, the allowable altitude band for maneuver entry 
for 35,000 ft pressure altitude (Hp) maneuvers was 32,000 to 38,000 ft Hp.  For the 
25,000 ft Hp maneuvers the allowable altitude band was 22,000 to 28,000 ft Hp.  For the 
15,000 ft Hp maneuvers the allowable altitude band was 12,000 to 18,000 ft Hp.  
Operational maneuvers were performed down to 10,000 ft AGL during the first two 
flights for operational maneuvers, and down to 5,000 ft AGL during the last two flights 
for operational maneuvers.  
F/A-18 A-D DAF Operation 
The flight test DAF option in the FCC software allowed predetermined, pre-tested 
alterations of selected constants inside the control law software during flight. This option 
could be used to optimize parameters (e.g., roll rates) or be used to reduce risk in the 
flight control system development by allowing for quick changes to the flight control 
software in areas where changes were likely to be needed during flight test. 
After selecting the desired option and engaging DAF, the constants contained in 
the DAF table and option replace their control law counterparts. Faders are used, as 
appropriate, to minimize engage transients. The test pilot evaluates the performance with 
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the DAF option and can, if desired, choose another DAF option or baseline (DAF 
disengaged) for comparison. 
DAF is a special flight test mode that is inhibited in production software releases. 
There are several safety interlocks that prevent it from operating in a production box and 
it requires several special procedures to enable it for flight test purposes. 
 
INSTRUMENTATION CHECK OUT AND RIG CHECK 
Maneuvering Objectives 
 A single flight was flown with FCC V10.5.1 to verify proper operation of 
instrumentation, proper rig of the test aircraft's control surfaces, and that the radome on 
the test aircraft was suitable for maneuvers at high AOA. The FCS rig check and HI 
AOA radome check were also performed on the single seat aircraft as required.  The rig 
check tested the roll off with neutral trim at airspeeds of 300, 400, 500, and 550 KCAS.  
The radome check determined if radome surface imperfections generated excessive 
directional divergence or yaw rate during at high AOA from pure longitudinal stick 
inputs.  This check used a 1g full aft stick stall an abrupt aft stick pull accelerated stall.  
Failure criteria was if yaw rate exceeded 15 deg/sec, sideslip exceeded 10 deg, the 
aircraft departed, or the spin mode logic activated during either the 1g or accelerated 
stalls. 
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Lateral Stick Rolls  
Rolls were performed to baseline the roll performance of the aircraft with OFP 
v10.5.1 software as follows: 
 
1.  Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude. 
2.  Establish bank angle as required. 
3.  Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by 
applying power or diving as required. 
4.  When stabilized at the target AOA, maintain longitudinal stick (±1/2 
in.) and apply abrupt lateral stick to roll under the bottom. 
5.  Remove control inputs after 360 degree roll angle change or after 15 
seconds. 
Success Criteria: 
 •  Longitudinal stick maintained within ± 1/2 in during roll. 
 •  Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude.  
 •  Full lateral stick input within 0.3 sec. 
Abrupt Pull-Ups 
1. Establish the desired test conditions. 
2. Select MIL power and abruptly apply full aft stick (within 0.25 
seconds), and hold for 2.5 seconds. Monitor load factor and angle of 
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attack. If Nz ref or an AOA limit is reached, terminate maneuver by 
relaxing aft stick input. 
3. Recover to wings level flight. 
4.5 – 5.0 g Loop 
1. Establish 1 g level flight at 0.8 IMN and 10,000 ft Hp. 
2. Select MIL power and smoothly apply aft stick to capture and 
maintain desired initial load factor. Decrease load factor following 
the "1 percent rule" (load factor 1 percent of calibrated airspeed).  
Maintain bank angle using lateral stick inputs and referencing the 
horizon. 
Break-Turns 
1. Establish the desired initial conditions. 
2. Smoothly roll to 90 deg angle of bank.  Reduce throttles to idle and 
abruptly pull to maximum load factor and/or AOA. 
3. After maximum AOA is reached, recover. 
FLIGHT TEST BUILDUP APPROACH DURING OFP V10.6.1 DEVELOPMENT 
The test sequencing during initial OFP v10.6.1 development was divided into four 
major phases, with each phase having specific maneuvering objectives and buildup 
sequencing: 
Phase 1 – Prediction Model and Control Law Algorithm Assessment 
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Phase 2 – Out-of-Control Recovery Demonstration 
Phase 3 – Departure Resistance/Susceptibility/Recovery; Failures 
Phase 4 – Operational Assessment 
 
The test objectives, test loading and test point sequencing, maneuver descriptions, 
and KIO criteria for each phase are described below: 
 
PHASE 1 TEST MANEUVERS 
Maneuvering Objectives 
The objective of Phase 1 was conduct single-axis maneuvers with very low risk of 
departure so that the accuracy of the prediction models and control law algorithms could 
be assessed.  Test points in Phase 1 were selected based on simulations that predict a 
clear absence of departure, with knock-it-off criteria also established to avoid a departure. 
 Any point known to depart with V10.5.1 control laws but predicted fixed in the V10.6.1 
control laws were not flown in this phase to further mitigate departure risk.  
Test Sequencing 
Test sequencing was a buildup of external loadings, maneuvers, and AOA.  Mach 
number was sequenced from low to high as a buildup, following by a buildup of high 
altitude to low altitude.  The buildup utilized was specifically as follows: 
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Loading Buildup 
The aircraft is flown first without a centerline tank, transitioning to flights with a 
centerline tank. 
Maneuver Buildup 
Longitudinal-only maneuvers were conducted first before rolling maneuvers within 
each configuration.  All longitudinal points at all flight conditions were conducted prior 
to rolling maneuvers.  The objectives of the longitudinal points were to show adequate 
lateral-directional damping of small perturbations, and to also exercise the AOA 
Estimator used to compute AOA beyond the probe limit of 35 degrees.   
Rolling maneuvers were conducted next, in the order of low-AOA to high AOA at each 
flight condition progressing from low Mach to high Mach number at high altitude, then 
transitioning to lower altitude.  Lateral-only inputs were conducted first, followed by 
pedal-only, followed by lateral+pedal. Lateral+Pedal inputs are designed to engage the 
new “Pirouette logic” to substantially boost high AOA roll performance and was 
considered the highest risk for roll overshoots – but with sideslip excursions predicted to 
be well-controlled for all configurations.  Roll maneuver test points with the two-place 
aircraft configured with a centerline tank were limited to 25 degrees AOA to avoid the 
V10.5.1 departure-prone regime near 35 degrees AOA.  Roll maneuver test points of 30 
degrees and above were conducted on the single-place aircraft with centerline tank – a 
more stable configuration – to collect the needed data while mitigating the departure risk.  
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 Maneuver Entry and KIO Criteria 
All roll maneuvers were terminated at 360 degrees of roll angle change or 15 
seconds duration, whichever came first. Sideslip was monitored with a knock-it-off 
criteria of 15 degrees.  The FCC lagged yaw rate used to determine a spin condition was 
also monitored with a knock-it-off criteria of 15 degrees – 2 degrees less than the 17-
degree threshold used for the spin condition indication.  This knock-it-off criterion was 
used to guard against immediate spin mode entry during a normal roll maneuver if a spin 
arrow should inadvertently be presented.  Note that the spin arrow presentation is both a 
condition of lagged yaw rate greater than 17 degrees, and also indicated compressible 
dynamic pressure (qc) less than 50 psf.  Since indicated dynamic pressure can read 
erroneously low at high AOA, the qc<50 condition was assumed to always exist.  
Test Maneuvers 
Longitudinal Maneuvers--1g Stalls   
1.  Establish 1-g level flight 5,000 ft above specified altitude. 
2.  Reduce power to IDLE and allow AOA to increase. 
3.  Sample handling qualities every 5 deg AOA by performing pitch, 
lateral, and rudder doublets. 
4.  Gradually apply aft stick to increase AOA 
5.  Apply lateral stick and rudder pedal inputs as required to offset 
any roll-off tendencies. 
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6.  At full aft stick, hold for 5 sec and sample handling qualities in 
each axis. 
Terminate maneuver by releasing controls. 
 
Success Criteria:  Maneuver conducted within 5,000 ft of target altitude. 
Wind-Down/Break Turns   
Wind-down turns (WDTs) were used to evaluate the accuracy of the AOA 
estimator when AOA is greater than 35 deg: 
1.  Establish the specified initial conditions. 
2.  Smoothly roll into an overbanked turn, applying aft stick at a target 
rate of 1 inch/sec. Selected test points will be repeated as a break 
turn, with an abrupt full aft stick input (full input within 0.25 sec).  
3.  Maintain full aft stick until airspeed reaches 80 KCAS.  
4.  Terminate maneuver by releasing controls. 
 
Success Criteria: 
 •  Full aft stick is attained within ± 0.05 Mach of target Mach. 
Lateral Maneuvers -  
Lateral Stick Rolls: 
1.  Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude. 
2.  Establish bank angle as required. 
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3.  Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by 
applying power or diving as required. 
4.  When stabilized at the target AOA, maintain longitudinal stick (±1/2 
in.) and apply abrupt lateral stick to roll over the top, or under the 
bottom (as required). 
5. Remove control inputs after 360 degree roll angle change or after 15 
seconds. 
Success Criteria: 
 •  Longitudinal stick maintained within ± 1/2 in during roll. 
 •  Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude.  
 •  Full lateral stick input within 0.3 sec. 
Sustained Pedal Rolls  
1.  Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude. 
2.  Establish bank angle as required. 
3.  Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by 
applying power or diving as required. 
4.  Maintain longitudinal and lateral stick (±1/2 in.) and apply abrupt 
pedal. 
5.  Remove control inputs after 360 degree roll angle change or after 15 
seconds. 
Success Criteria:  
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•  Longitudinal and lateral stick maintained within ± 1/2 in. of neutral 
during roll. 
•  Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude. 
•  Full pedal input within 0.3 sec. 
Combined Lateral Stick plus Pedal Rolls  
1.  Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude. 
2.  Establish bank angle as required. 
3.  Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by 
applying power or diving as required. 
4.  When stabilized at the target AOA, maintain longitudinal stick (±1/2 
in.) and apply abrupt simultaneous lateral stick and pedal to roll over 
the top or under the bottom. 
5.  Remove control inputs after 360 degree roll angle change or after 15 
seconds. 
Success Criteria:  
•  Longitudinal stick maintained within ± 1/2 in. of neutral during roll. 
 •  Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude. 
 •  Full control inputs within 0.3 sec. 
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PHASE 2 TEST MANEUVERS 
Maneuvering Objectives 
The objective of this phase was to verify recovery from post-departure gyrations 
(PDGs) and sustained OCF modes. Recovery from OCF modes was evaluated during 
Phase 2 to reduce the risk and minimize the consequences of entering OCF modes during 
Phase 3.  Departure recoveries from PDGs resulting from tailslides and vertical 
recoveries, upright spins, and falling leafs were evaluated.  Inverted spins were not 
planned since the control law update has not affected negative AOA, and no large 
negative AOA points were planned. Only NATOPS recovery techniques were evaluated, 
however, alternate recovery techniques were available if NATOPS recovery techniques 
fail to recover the aircraft.  
Test Sequencing 
Test points were conducted on the most stable external loading first (FE), 
progressing to less stable with a centerline tank.  Full-up control laws were flown first, 
followed by a simulated failure of the INS attitudes (INS-OFF mode).  The final Phase 2 
testing was conducted with a 6K ft-lb lateral weight asymmetry since lateral weight 
asymmetries have historically resulted in the longest recovery times. 
Loading Buildup 
Two-place Fighter Escort was flown first, followed by the two-place FCL loading, 
followed by INS-OFF testing in the two-place FCL loading, followed by the two-place 
6K asymmetry loading.  The first three loadings were flown consecutively in preparation 
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for the Phase 3 testing with similar loadings.  Recovery in INS-OFF mode was 
demonstrated in this phase in case the mode is unexpectedly entered during follow-on 
testing.  The Phase 2 testing with the 6K asymmetry loading was flown later in the 
program, but prior to the majority of the test points in that configuration.  Out-of-control 
recovery points in the INS-OFF mode and in the 6K asymmetry loading were preceded 
with longitudinal maneuvers, which were not predicted to depart controlled flight.  
Maneuver Buildup 
 Spins were conducted first, in the order of increasing maximum yaw rate target 
buildup. A half turn incipient spin was conducted in loading FE and 6KASYM prior to 
the fully developed spins for buildup and to evaluate NATOPS recovery techniques.  
Spins were conducted stepping up at 30, 60, and 90 degrees/second. Three spins were 
conducted at each target yaw rate before moving up to the next rate. 
Vertical recoveries and tailslides were conducted next. Tailslides were also be 
performed with the nose of the aircraft biased just prior to and just beyond the vertical, 
and then with the nose of the aircraft biased left and right of vertical. Low-speed banked 
flight has been shown to be a common way that falling leaf motion has been entered in 
fleet events, giving the tailslide with the nose biased either left or right of vertical the best 
chance of entering falling leaf motion. 
Intentional falling leaf entry maneuvers using MSRM for entry were conducted last, 
being historically the motion requiring most altitude for recovery.  Because the v10.6.1 
control laws were designed to damp this motion, sustained falling leaf motion was not 
possible once MSRM was disabled. 
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Real Time Trend Analysis 
Spins were evaluated in a yaw rate buildup of 30, 60, and 90 deg/sec.  The Test 
Team evaluated each recovery and determined if the recovery met expectations.  The 
next highest yaw rate point would then be attempted only if the test team felt that the 
recovery would be adequate based on the trends of the buildups and predictions. Time for 
yaw rate to decay, number of turns before recovery, and altitude lost during recovery 
were used as metrics to measure the recovery performance. 
Falling leaf motion should be damped promptly after MSRM is disabled.  The test 
team evaluated each recovery and would have recommended that further entry attempts 
not be made if the recovery was prolonged and not as predicted (i.e. any prolonged 
departure that descends below 20,000 ft Hp).  
Test Maneuvers 
 Descriptions of OCF mode entry and recovery techniques are given in the 
following sections.   
Spins 
 All spin entries were made using asymmetric thrust. MSRM was used if target 
yaw rate could not be attained using asymmetric thrust. Maximum target yaw rate was 90 
deg/sec.  A single half turn incipient spin was performed in loadings FE and 6KASYM. 
Buildup spins were flown using target yaw rates of 30 and 60 deg/sec, both to the left and 
right. Recovery was made by moving the throttles to IDLE, deactivating MSRM (if 
used), and applying NATOPS recovery controls.  
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Asymmetric Thrust Upright Spin Procedures 
1. Stabilize at wings level, 150 KCAS and 35,000 ft Hp. 
2. Slowly reduce both throttles to IDLE, set 20 to 25 deg pitch attitude, and 
hold. 
3. At 35 deg AOA, smoothly apply full aft stick.  
4. Smoothly increase thrust on left/right engine to MIL with the other engine at 
IDLE until target yaw rate is achieved. Apply full pro-spin rudder pedal 
input, relax aft stick, and pro-spin lateral stick as required. 
5. To recover, bring both throttles to IDLE, remove rudder pedal input, relax full 
aft stick and apply NATOPS recovery controls. 
MSRM Upright Spin 
Stabilize at wings level, 150 KCAS and 35,000 ft Hp. 
Select spin recovery switch to RCVY and reduce power to IDLE. 
Establish downward flight path angle of approximately 20 degrees. 
Smoothly apply full aft stick. 
After spin mode engages, smoothly apply full rudder pedal. 
Smoothly increase thrust on engine opposite of rudder pedal input to MIL 
with other engine at IDLE until target yaw rate is achieved. 
Slowly apply lateral stick opposite rudder pedal input while coming off the 
aft stop. 
At the target yaw rate, neutralize controls and bring both throttles to IDLE. 
Select spin recovery switch to NORM and apply NATOPS recovery controls. 
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Tailslides / 100 KCAS Vertical Recoveries 
Tailslide maneuvers were performed to evaluate departure resistance: 
Start at 30,000 ft Hp / 300-350 KCAS. 
In MIL power, pull to an upward, near vertical attitude. 
When the aircraft no longer responds to control inputs, reduce power to 
IDLE, release the controls and allow the aircraft to recover. 
 
Variations to this maneuver included: 
1.  Biasing the nose attitude of the aircraft in the following ways: nose 
forward, nose back, nose left, and nose right. 
2.  At 100 KCAS, apply full forward or full aft stick, releasing controls and 
reducing power to IDLE when the aircraft no longer responds to control 
inputs. 
3.  At 100 KCAS, apply full forward or full aft stick, reducing power to 
IDLE when the aircraft no longer responds to control inputs, and 
releasing controls when sustained oscillations develop or when the 
aircraft descends through 30,000 ft Hp. 
4.  At 180 KCAS, apply full lateral then either full forward or aft stick after 
maximum roll rate is reached, releasing controls and reducing power to 
IDLE when the aircraft no longer responds to control inputs. 
5.  At 180 KCAS, apply full lateral then either full forward or aft stick after 
maximum roll rate is reached, reducing power to IDLE when the aircraft 
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no longer responds to control inputs, and releasing controls when 
sustained oscillations develop or when the aircraft descends through 
30,000 ft Hp. 
 
Falling Leaf Test Points 
 Not all falling leaf entry attempts were successful.  For the purpose of this test, a 
sustained falling leaf was defined as at least two cycles of in-phase rolling and yawing 
motion. 
MSRM Falling Leaf Entry: 
1. Stabilize at wings level, 0.5 IMN /40K (145 KCAS). 
2. Select spin recovery switch to RCVY to enter MSRM and reduce power to 
IDLE. 
3. Establish dive angle of approximately 20 degrees. 
4. Smoothly apply full aft stick and hold. 
5. Apply lateral stick to generate sideslip (some side-to-side cycling may be 
necessary to generate largest sideslip). 
6. Neutralize controls.  Falling leaf motion is characterized by large sustained 
oscillatory yaw rate motion with approximate 5 second period.  Allow motion 
to persist for two cycles or until 25,000 feet altitude. 
7. Recover by selecting spin recovery switch to NORM and neutralizing 
controls.  Falling leaf motion should be damped promptly after CAS is 
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enabled due to the sideslip rate feedback and other control law features 
incorporated in the upgraded flight control system. 
 
PHASE 3 TESTING 
Maneuvering Objectives 
The objectives of Phase 3 were to evaluate departure resistance and to evaluate 
recovery from departure. 
Test Sequencing 
Test sequencing in Phase 3 was in the order of test points least likely to depart with 
single-axis input to intentional departures with multi-axis inputs, and then to failure 
modes.  Configurations were flown in the order of most-stable symmetric to least-stable 
symmetric, then to asymmetric loadings – smallest asymmetry to largest asymmetry, then 
to a symmetric loading with an aft CG.   
Loading Buildup 
The external loadings were sequenced generally from most-stable to least-stable for 
the series of single-axis long-duration inputs, including those points that were predicted 
to depart in the V10.5.1 control laws.  Loading sequencing were two-place FCL (high 
AOA points), single-place FCL (low AOA points), Interdiction, Two-Tank, 6K 
asymmetry, 12K asymmetry, and aft CG Fighter Escort.  Once those points were 
completed, the loading shifted back to a more stable loading of the two-place FCL to 
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perform the multi-axis aggravated inputs, followed by multi-axis inputs repeated in the 




AOA/Mach number/Altitude buildup for the long-duration single-axis maneuvers 
were similar to Phase 1.  Roll maneuvering buildup was also be similar to Phase 1, 
starting with lateral-only, progressing to pedal-only, progressing to lateral+pedal. For test 
points for which sideslips were predicted to be greater than 15º or yaw rates were 
predicted to be greater than 40º/sec, the onsite test team added half input or 180º or 360º 
buildup test points. Operational assessment of the pirouette maneuver was conducted 
after the long-duration lateral+pedal maneuvers were conducted.  An extra assessment of 
inadvertently engaging the Automatic Spin Recovery Mode was conducted upon 
evaluating the results of the long-duration single-axis control inputs. 
The order of the aggravated multi-axis inputs was in the order of those maneuvers 
that were predicted to remain controlled, to maneuvers that were predicted to depart.   
Since Phase 2 testing had already demonstrated OCF recovery, the risk of departure 
had been mitigated whether the Phase 3 maneuvers departed or not.  The assumption was 
that all Phase 3 maneuvers will depart and that the recovery risk had been mitigated. 
For the failure modes, INS-OFF was conducted first, followed by other redundancy 
management failure modes.  Failure mode sequencing was not vital, since no testing 
depends on the other. 
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Maneuver Entry and KIO Criteria 
Maneuvers were terminated at 720 degrees of roll angle change or 15 seconds, 
whichever came first, while under controlled flight  
Test Maneuvers - The maneuvers for this phase are summarized below  
Longitudinal Maneuvers  
1g Stalls  - See maneuver descriptions for Phase 1. 
 
Wind-Down Turns  - See maneuver descriptions for Phase 1. 
Lateral Maneuvers - Rolls were performed in alternating directions. Rolls in the 
asymmetric loadings were performed in both directions, and rolls were 
performed in the non-critical direction first (based on simulation predictions). 
The exception to this was rolls selected for regression testing, which were 
performed in the most critical direction based on simulation predictions, 
Lateral Stick Rolls  
1.  Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude. 
2.  Establish bank angle as required. 
3.  Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by 
applying power or diving as required. 
4.  When stabilized at the target AOA, maintain longitudinal stick (±1/2 
in.) and apply abrupt lateral stick to roll over the top, or under the 
bottom (as required). 
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5.  Remove control inputs after 720 degree roll angle change or after 15 
seconds. 
Success Criteria: 
 •  Longitudinal stick maintained within ± 1/2 in during roll. 
 •  Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude.  
 •  Full lateral stick input within 0.3 sec. 
 
Sustained Pedal Rolls  For conditions above 1 g Nz. 
1.  Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude. 
2.  Establish bank angle as required. 
3.  Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by 
applying power or diving as required. 
For conditions at or less than 1 g Nz. 
1.  Establish 1-g level flight 1,000 ft below specified altitude. Select 
wing fuel transfer to INHIBIT. 
2.  Establish a pitch attitude with the nose of the aircraft above the 
horizon. 
3.  Apply forward stick to capture specified AOA and attempt to hold 
flight condition by applying power as required. 
 
When established on conditions: 
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4.  Maintain longitudinal and lateral stick (±1/2 in.) and apply abrupt 
pedal. 
5.  Remove control inputs after 720 degree roll angle change or after 15 
seconds.  Select wing fuel transfer to NORM (as required). 
Success Criteria:  
•  Longitudinal and lateral stick maintained within ± 1/2 in during roll. 
•  Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude. 
•  Full pedal input in within 0.3 sec. 
 
In addition to the general KIO criteria for Phase 3, the plan terminated the 
maneuver once any of the following criteria were exceeded: 
 
- 30 seconds at negative Nz. 
- Engine oil pressure caution. 
- Fuel boost pressure low caution. 
Combined Lateral Stick plus Pedal Rolls  
1.  Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude. 
2.  Establish bank angle as required. 
3.  Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by 
applying power or diving as required. 
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4.  When stabilized at the target AOA, maintain longitudinal stick (±1/2 
in.) and apply abrupt simultaneous lateral stick and pedal to roll over 
the top or under the bottom. 
5.  Remove control inputs after 720 degree roll angle change or after 15 
seconds. 
  Success Criteria:  
•  Longitudinal stick maintained within ± 1/2 in during roll. 
 •  Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude. 
 •  Full control inputs within 0.3 sec. 
Pirouettes  
Establish 1-g flight at the specified initial conditions. 
Coordinate a pull to approximately 30 to 40 degrees AOA with a pitch 
attitude of approximately 50 to 90 degrees nose high. 
Holding aft stick to maintain AOA, insert a combined lateral stick and 
pedal input to perform a nose-high to nose-low heading reversal. 
Continuing to hold aft stick to maintain AOA, apply aggressive 
opposite lateral stick and pedal to capture the target heading. 
Aggravated Control Inputs - The set-ups to these maneuvers were identical to a 
lateral stick roll.  Instead of applying lateral stick, however, one of the following 
inputs as specified was applied: 
- Simultaneous lateral and aft input (to aft corner). 
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- Simultaneous lateral and forward input (to forward corner). 
- Simultaneous lateral and pedal input in same direction with aft stick input. 
- Simultaneous lateral and pedal input in same direction with forward stick 
input. 
- Simultaneous lateral and pedal inputs in opposite direction. 
- Simultaneous lateral and pedal input in opposite direction with aft stick 
input. 
- Full lateral stick to achieve maximum roll rate at the test flight 
condition.  At maximum roll rate, apply full aft stick for the 
remainder of the maneuver. 
Flat and Rolling Scissors 
As buildup for the operational maneuvers in Phase 4, flat and rolling scissors were 
performed to evaluate the performance of the AOA estimator during prolonged 
maneuvers above 35 deg AOA. 
Failure Modes 
The following failure modes were evaluated during phase 3: True airspeed or 
MUX bus invalid, INS attitude angles invalid, AOA probe failures and stuck AOA 
probes. The following paragraphs describe how each of these failures were 
simulated. 
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True Airspeed or MUX Bus invalid True Airspeed  
True airspeed is used by the upgraded control laws in the calculation to estimate 
AOA when the mechanical AOA probes are pegged. The software includes a 
calculation to estimate true airspeed when either the Mission Computer declares 
true airspeed invalid, or in the event of a MUX Bus failure. For this test program, a 
DAF option was used that forced the FCCs into using estimated true airspeed. 
INS Attitude Angles  
INS roll and pitch attitude angles are used in the AOA and sideslip estimation 
logic. In the event that the INS attitudes become invalid, the AOA and sideslip 
estimators are designed to degrade to a backup mode. In the production aircraft, 
selecting the attitude selector switch to STBY on the on the HUD results in the 
INS attitudes being declared invalid. With v10.6.1 and v10.7, this forces the FCC 
to ignore the INS attitudes and degrade the AOA and sideslip estimators to their 
respective backup modes. 
AOA Probe Failures 
Changes that are designed to improve the handling of stuck AOA probes or total 
failures of the AOA probe were included in v10.6.1 and v10.7. To evaluate these 
improvements, DAF was used to simulate a single stuck AOA probe or a total 
AOA failure. Testing was performed with the left AOA probe simulated stuck at 
0.1 degrees and with a simulated total AOA probe failure. 
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PHASE 4 TESTING 
Maneuvering Objectives 
The objectives of Phase 4 were to evaluate departure resistance and evaluate flying 
qualities during operational maneuvers.  All flights were flown with adherence to the 
Navy standard air combat maneuvering (ACM) training rules. The FCLP loading of 
centerline fuel tank and empty wing pylons was flown in this phase. 
Test Sequencing 
 Test sequencing consideration was only in terms of single-place/two-place test 
order.  The successful completion of the first three phases allowed full aircraft usage 
under NATOPS limitations, except removal of the subsonic two-place placard regarding 
AOA and Mach number restrictions.    
Loading Buildup 
 Even though the single-place was the more stable of the two configurations, the 
two-place aircraft was flown first since it contained more detailed instrumentation.   
Maneuver Entry and KIO Criteria 
Maneuvers were constrained under NATOPS limitations, except as modified or 
expanded based on Phase 3 testing. The hard deck (minimum altitude for ACM) was 
10,000 ft Hp for the first two flights, and 5,000 ft Hp for all subsequent flights. 
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Test Maneuvers 
Test maneuvers included Air-to-Air Target Gross Acquisition and Fine Tracking at 
High AOA,  flat and rolling scissors, pirouettes.  Additionally, other operationally 
representative ACM drills and engagements were conducted including offensive and 
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APPENDIX B:  OUT OF CONTROL EMERGENCY RECOVERY 
PROCEDURES 
 
(NOTE: NATOPS procedures appear in normal font, alternate recovery procedures 
appear in italics. From David, 2003) 
 
RECOVERY INDICATIONS AND PROCEDURES 
 
Recovery is indicated when AOA and yaw rate tone is removed, side forces subside, and 
airspeed is increasing above 180 KCAS. 
 
One g roll to nearest horizon 
Throttles – MAX (MIL if altitude not critical) 
Pull to and maintain 25 to 35 deg AOA until positive rate of climb established (AOA 
configuration dependent). With LEF failures do not exceed 10 deg AOA. 
 
DEPARTURE/FALLING LEAF RECOVERY PROCEDURES 
 
Controls – release / feet off rudders / speedbrake in 
If still out of control – Throttles – Idle 
Altitude, AOA, airspeed, and yaw rate – Check 
When recovery indicated by AOA and yaw rate tones removed, side forces subsided, 
and airspeed accelerating above 180 knots - Recover 
Passing 6,000 ft AGL, dive recovery not initiated - Eject 
 
SUSTAINED OSCILLATORY MOTION RECOVERY PROCEDURES 
 
If INS angle errors are suspected (HUD or RTPS call) - Attitude Selector Switch – 
STBY. 
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If recovery not indicated below 15,000 ft Hp – FCS -- Reset 
 
If recovery not indicated below 10,000 ft Hp - Throttles – MAX A/B 
 
If still no sign of recovery and below 10,000 ft AGL - FCS Gain Override Switch – 
ORIDE 
 
When recovery indicated by AOA and yaw rate tones removed, side forces subsided, 
and airspeed accelerating above 180 knots – Check FCS Gain Override Switch 
NORM and Recover 
 
Passing 6,000 ft AGL, dive recovery not initiated - Eject 
 
SPIN RECOVERY PROCEDURES 
 
Command arrow present - Lateral stick – full with arrow 
 
Command arrow not present – Spin recovery switch – RCVY 
 
Lateral stick – Full with arrow 
 
When yaw rate stops – Lateral stick – Smoothly Neutral 
 
Spin recovery switch – Check NORM 
 
When recovery indicated – Recover  
 
Passing 6,000 ft AGL, dive recovery not initiated – Eject 
 
SUSTAINED SPIN RECOVERY PROCEDURES 
 
If INS angle errors are suspected (HUD OR RTPS call) Attitude Selector Switch – 
STBY. 
  
Yaw rate not arresting with full lateral stick 
 Spin recovery switch – RCVY 
Lateral stick – Full with arrow 
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If spin shows no sign of recovery: 
Right yaw rate – Right engine MAX A/B 
Left yaw rate – Left engine MAX A/B 
 
WHEN YAW RATE STOPS  
 Engines - Idle 
Lateral stick – Smoothly neutral 
Spin recovery switch – Check NORM 
 
When recovery indicated 
Recover 
Passing 6,000 ft AGL, dive recovery not initiated - 
Eject 
 
Dual Engine Flameout or Single with Imminent Dual Engine Flameout due to 
Fuel Starvation During Departures: 
 
Recover to controlled flight 
 
Accelerate to 350-375 KCAS approximately 50-60 deg nose-down. 
 
 Decrease and maintain pitch to not exceed 20 deg nose-down 
 
Maintain RPM >/= 12% (accelerate if necessary to maintain). 
 
Monitor fuel flow indicators for fuel flow (may take ~60 sec.) 
 
Initiate relight procedures per NATOPS once fuel flow is indicated. 
 
If windmill relight is unsuccessful or fuel flow does not respond by 10,000 ft, push to 
20 deg nose-down, gently pull approximately 2g to increase fuel pressure head, then 
reset to 20 deg nose-down. 
 
 
Below 10,000 ft Hp, decelerate below 250 KCAS, start APU and attempt to crank 
either engine. If propulsion engineers suspect either engine has been damaged, they 
will advise pilot which engine should be started. 
 
Passing 2,000 ft AGL with no indications of relight, EJECT. 
 
Note:  All procedures for dual engine flameout are immediate action items. Single engine 
flameout without BOOST LO warning is likely NOT fuel deprivation related. In this 
case, normal NATOPS flameout emergency procedures should be followed. 
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HIGH AOA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE BRIEFING GUIDE 
 
 EMERGENCY CONTROL PRIMARY 
 SITUATION ROOM CALL MONITOR/COMMUNICATOR 
 
AERO/FQ 
Unexpected Departure “Recover – Sideslip (Yaw Rate)” FQ/FQ 
  “Controls – Release” TC/TC 
  “Speedbrake – In” TC/TC 
  “Throttles – IDLE” TC/TC 
 
Sustained Out-Of-Control 
 Suspect INS angles “Attitude – Standby” FQ/TC 
 (AOA or sideslip errors) 
 or Channel 2 or 4 fail  FC/TC 
 Oscillatory Yaw Rate (FL):   
Alt < 20,000 ft Hp and 12,000 ft lost “Cleared for full aft stick” FQ/TC 
 
 Alt < 10,000 ft Hp “Throttles – MAX” FQ/TC 
 (with no engine anomalies) 
 
 
No Recovery  “25,000”, “20,000”, “15,000”, “10,000” TC/TC 
  (advisory altitude calls) 
  “6,000 – Eject, Eject, Eject” TC/TC 
 
PROPULSION 
Engine Stall/Stagnation “Recover – Throttles IDLE – (Reason)” Prop/TC 
 /Flameout 
 
Unrecoverable Stall/Stag “(Left/Right) Throttle – Off – (Reason)” Prop/TC 
/Flameout Or Overtemp 
 
Engine Restart “(Left/Right) Throttle – IDLE” Prop/TC 
(Aircraft recovered within airstart envelope) 
 
Dual Engine Flameout “Start APU” TC/TC 
 (and below 10,000 ft Hp  “Crank (Left/Right)” TC/TC 
and < 250 KCAS) 
Below 2,000 ft AGL “2,000 – Eject, Eject, Eject” TC/TC 
 
OTHER 
FCS “X” Out During Departure/OOC 
and no HYD 1B caution with Left  
LEF failure or HYD 2A caution with 
Right LEF failure “Flight Controls – Reset” FC/TC 
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APPENDIX C:  SAFETY OF TEST MEASURAND LIST 
(Excerpt from David, 2003) 
 
Parameter Description RTPS Monitor 
Pressure Altitude TC 
Airspeed TC 
Fuel Weight TC 
Lateral Asymmetry TC 
Percent CG TC 
Corrected AOA FQ1 
FCC Estimated AOA FQ1 
AOSS FQ1 
FCC Estimated AOSS FQ1/FQ2 
Pitch Attitude FQ1/FQ2 
Roll Attitude FQ1/FQ2 
Pitch Rate FQ1/FQ2 
Roll Rate FQ1/FQ2 
Yaw Rate FQ1/FQ2 
Lagged Yaw Rate FQ1/FQ2 
Nz FQ1/FQ2 
Longitudinal Stick Position FQ1/FQ2 
Lateral Stick Position FQ1/FQ2 
Rudder Pedal Force FQ1/FQ2 
Spin Mode Engaged FQ1/FQ2 
Beta * Q FQ1/FQ2 
SQRT(P2+R2) FQ1/FQ2 
FCS Status Display FC 
L/R Power Lever Angle Prop 
L/R N2 Prop 
L/R Engine T5 Prop 




 TC = Test Conductor 
 FQ1/2 = Flying Qualities Engineers 
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